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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDTNGS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j), this case having been transferred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on December 15, 
2000. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Appellants' 
business operation was not grandfathered by Salt Lake County's granting of a business 
license to Appellants prior to the annexation of the property by the City of South Salt 
Lake. This issue presents a question of law as to the interpretation of §10-9-408, Utah 
Code Annotated, for which the standard of review is correctness. See, e.g., Hugoe v. 
Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame, 
836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Appellants had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing to seek administrative review by 
the business license hearing board of the City of South Salt Lake, when the City failed to 
follow its own ordinances concerning its rescinding or denial of Appellants5 business 
license. This issue also presents a question of law, reviewable for correctness. Id. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the City's denial of 
the rezone application concerning Appellants' property was not arbitrary, capricious, and 
constituted or condoned an illegal reverse spot zoning of the area in which Appellants' 
property is situated. In reviewing a municipality's decision not to change the zoning 
classification of a property, the decision is presumed to be valid and the standard of 
review is to "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). The definitions of "arbitrary" and "capricious" 
are legal issues reviewed for correctness. Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT 
App 31 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, P22, 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated, §10-9-408. 
10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or 
structure may be continued. 
The full text of § 10-9-408 appears in the Addendum to this brief. 
§ 19.48.010, etseq., of the Salt Lake County zoning regulations. 
The full text of §19.48 of the Salt Lake County zoning regulations appears 
in the Addendum to this brief. 
§ 5.02.170 of the ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake (4/98). 
5.02.170 Notice of denial, suspension or revocation. 
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a business license application or 
business license, the business license official shall cause written notice to be given 
by personal service or registered mail to the applicant or licensee of his or her 
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an application or license. Such notice shall 
include the reasons for the denial, suspension or revocation of such application or 
license, and shall include any accompanying documentation relating to the 
business license official's decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application or 
business license. Such notice shall also include a description, if applicable, of the 
applicant's or licensee's right to appeal the decision of the business license 
official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part))) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Ty Webber and Statewide Bail Bonds (hereinafter 
referred to as "Statewide") acquired a business license from Salt Lake County for 
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operation of a bail-bonding business out of Mr. Webber's home, located across the street 
from the new Salt Lake County Detention Center, at 3350 South 900 West, in Salt Lake 
County, prior to annexation of the area by the City of South Salt Lake (hereinafter 
referred to as "the City"). Statewide alleges that the business was therefore 
grandfathered, so that the City's refusal to issue a current business license to Statewide is 
in contravention of Statewide's right to a license. 
Statewide has also alleged that, following the administrative decisions 
handed down by the City, the City failed to give Statewide proper notice of the City's 
denial of the business license in conformity with its own ordinances, and failed to provide 
Statewide notice of its right to appeal and the timing and methodology for taking such an 
appeal, along with notice of all other administrative remedies that might have been 
available. By failing to abide by its own ordinances, the City proceeded in an illegal 
manner that rendered Statewide incapable of exhausting any administrative remedies and 
makes the City's denial of the business license invalid. 
Further, the City's refusal to rezone the area in which Statewide's business 
is located constitutes a refusal to acknowledge that the site is surrounded on three sides by 
massive commercial, light- industrial, and very large government complexes, so that 
denying the rezoning of this small site constitutes an illegal reverse spot zone, making the 
City's refusal to rezone arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 23, 1998, Appellants Ty Webber and Statewide 
Bail Bonds paid the required business license fee and applied for a business license from 
Salt Lake County, to operate a bail bonding company at the location of 3350 South 900 
West, Salt Lake County (R. 187; 242, Tj 4). 
2. Salt Lake County issued a business license to Statewide Bail Bonds 
effective as of July 23, 1998 (R. 13; 243,16; 282-3; Addenda 4, 5, 6). 
3. Salt Lake County was in the process of converting its computer 
system from one program to another, so a printed copy of the business license was not 
prepared until November 4, 1998, but Statewide Bail Bonds was legally conducting 
business in Salt Lake County as of July 23, 1998 (R. 93; 238; 282; Addendum 6). 
4. The bail bonding company was licensed at the location of 3350 
South 900 West as a home occupation/business, which was a permitted conditional use 
within the A-l (agricultural) zone and was appropriate under Tf 19.48.030 of the Salt 
Lake County zoning regulations (R. 116-117, 287-288; Addendum 6). 
5. The area within which Statewide's property lies was annexed to 
South Salt Lake City effective October 1, 1998 (R. 104, 170, 244). 
6. Statewide's business was grandfathered at the time of the annexation 
both by virtue of Statewide having acquired a proper business license from Salt Lake 
County prior to the annexation and by virtue of Statewide's legal operation of a home 
5 
business in an area zoned A-l? where such businesses were authorized (§ 10-9-408, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Addendum 1). 
6. On July 2, 1999, representatives of South Salt Lake wrote a letter to 
Statewide (R. 10-11, 57-58, 120-121), alleging that: 
a. At the time of annexation, the business was operating under a 
business license issued by Salt Lake County; 
b. The City of South Salt Lake honored that license by allowing 
the bail-bonding office to continue as a nonconforming use, with the provision that 
it meet all building code requirements for a business; 
c. The City had "discovered that the business license issued to 
[Statewide] by the county was in violation of the zoning regulations of the County 
and should NOT have been issued" and therefore the business did not have any 
legal nonconforming status; 
d. The City would not issue "a new license" for the property but 
would allow a reasonable time for the operations to be relocated "before taking 
any steps to force complete cessation of operations"; 
e. The City would allow operation for the remainder of the 1999 
calendar year provided certain conditions were met; 
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f. Statewide needed to obtain an inspection of the property, 
make all necessary corrections, and cease all storage within thirty days or cease all 
operations and relocate within the same time frame; 
g. Should Statewide wish to desire to continue with a request for 
a change in zoning, it needed to "finish the Community Council process and 
submit a petition to the Planning office, and, at the same time, request a review of 
the General Plan." 
7. The letter of July 2, 1999, did not state how Statewide's business 
license issued by the County was in violation of the zoning regulations; it was not a denial 
of a current business license application; and it did not contain a notice to Statewide of 
the proper forum and time frame for appealing a denial of a business license (R. 10-11, 
57-58, 120-121; Addendum 10). 
8. Under § 5.02.170 of the ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake 
(4/98), the City was required to "cause written notice to be given by personal service or 
registered mail to the applicant or licensee" of the City's decision to deny, suspend or 
revoke an application or license, and the notice must include the reasons for the denial, 
suspension or revocation and must include a description of the applicant's or licensee's 
right to appeal the decision of the business license official (Addendum 3). 
9. The City admitted, in f 6 of its "Statement of Facts" in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, that it notified Statewide 
by means of the letter of July 2, 1999, that its "business license application" was denied 
(R. 105). This statement is misleading, but is an admission that this notice was not 
personally served upon Statewide nor was it sent by registered mail, nor did it contain a 
notice of Statewide's rights to appeal and the time frame for such an appeal, so that the 
notice did not comply with the City's own ordinances (R. 245, 10, 57, 120, Addenda 3, 
10). 
10. Prior to receipt of the City's letter, in an attempt to legally be capable 
of storing vehicles and other items taken as collateral in the bail bonding business, Mr. 
Webber and Statewide applied (on June 2, 1999) for a rezoning of their property for 
commercial usage (R. 245, % 14). This effort, however, was merely an additional effort to 
ensure complete compliance with South Salt Lake City's desires, and had (and has) no 
effect upon the grandfathering of the license and the legal operation of the home business. 
11. When Statewide's rezoning application came before the City's 
Planning Commission on October 19, 1999 (R. 127-129), in a genuine misrepresentation 
of actual facts a member of the planning staff advised the Commission that Statewide's 
business license from Salt Lake County had been erroneously issued (contrary to the 
County's own position (Addenda 4, 5, 6)); that the property surrounding the subject 
property was zoned agricultural (contrary to the light industrial zoning that actually exists 
east and south of the subject property (R. 326)); that the general plan called for the area to 
remain agricultural (constituting a spot zone of agricultural use in an area of rapidly 
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growing business, government, and light industrial usages); and that the planning staff 
recommended denial of the rezoning (contrary to the City's own inspector stating 
otherwise to Mr. Webber and admitting that the City needed to take a new look at the area 
(R.246,f 16). 
12. Public comment at the hearing included a statement by one property 
owner that he had no objection to a change in the zoning of his property (which fronted 
on 900 West in likewise fashion as Statewide's property) so long as he was allowed to 
keep horses, and other comments included statements that the agricultural zone should 
remain where it actually exists, behind the buildings fronting 900 West. It was pointed 
out that the Sheriffs Office new substation was going to be built immediately south of 
the subject property (R. 127-128). 
13. The Planning and Zoning Commission voted to recommend denial of 
the application on four grounds: (1) rezoning would not conform to the General Plan; (2) 
rezoning would amount to spot zoning; (3) the city should retain the remaining 
agricultural land in its boundaries as agricultural; and (4) two-thirds of the City contains 
other property zoned to permit a bail-bonding business (R. 128-129). 
14. A public hearing on the rezoning application was held before the 
City Council on January 12, 2000, at which the same issues of maintaining the 
agricultural character of the area, conforming with the general plan, and spot zoning were 
discussed. The Council denied the rezoning application (R. 131-137). 
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15. Findings and Conclusions were prepared on January 20, 2000. The 
Findings failed to set forth the manner or details as to how the bail bonding business was 
illegal in an agricultural zone that allows home businesses, and did not address the matter 
of the proximity of the light industrial zone to Statewide's property (R. 140-141). 
16. The Conclusions erroneously stated that the parcel is not adjacent to 
or contiguous with similar zoning (the areas immediately to the east and to the south are 
already light industrial, and the area one-half block north is commercial (R. 324, 326)); 
that the request is contrary to the current General Plan (more government buildings are 
going up in the contiguous area even now (R. 324, 326)); that changing the zoning in the 
area was premature (the Sheriffs Office is presently beginning construction of a new call 
center facility adjacent to Statewide's property and the City, by its own admission, has 
received requests from two other bail bonding facilities to locate in the area (R. 324, 326; 
131-137)); and that the operation of a bail bond business from the subject location is 
illegal (it was previously approved by Salt Lake County as a home business and 
grandfathered as such at the time of the City's annexation of the property (Addenda 4, 5, 
and 6)). 
17. The County's zoning ordinance provides in § 19.48.020 that a "home 
occupation" is among the "permitted uses" of A-l Agricultural zone property. It does not 
define the meaning of "home occupation" (R.l 17, 287; Addendum 2). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Statewide's argument is three part. First, before the subject property was 
annexed into South Salt Lake City, it was subject to the zoning and business licensing 
regulations of Salt Lake County. The County issued Statewide a valid business license 
for the operation of a home-based bail-bonding business at its location directly across the 
street from the new Salt Lake County Detention Center. The County has verified, 
through letter, affidavit, and deposition, that Statewide's license was valid. Statewide's 
business was therefore grandfathered at the time it was annexed into South Salt Lake 
City. 
Secondly, when the City decided to rescind or revoke Statewide's business 
license, it did not follow the procedures outlined in its own ordinances, in that the notice 
was not properly delivered, did not contain an official denial of the application, did not 
set forth explanations for the denial, and did not give notice of Statewide's right, 
methodology, and timing for appealing the City's denial of the license. The City's action 
was therefore invalid. 
Lastly, the entire character of the area in which Statewide's business is 
located has changed dramatically over the period of the past five years, with the 
construction of a number of County and State facilities surrounding Statewide's property 
on three sides. On 900 West, only a small strip of five homes between 3300 South and 
Statewide's location at 3350 South remains non-commercial or non-light-industrial. The 
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other side of the street was already rezoned, and the west side of 900 West appears to be 
perhaps the only street in South Salt Lake City that does not have identical zoning 
designations on both sides of the street. The City's refusal to rezone this small area is 
unreasonable and irrational, and constitutes a reverse spot zoning of the area that is 
capricious, arbitrary, and illegal. It simply does not make sense in light of the land use in 
the local area. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. STATEWIDE OPERATED UNDER A VALID 
BUSINESS LICENSE ISSUED BY SALT LAKE COUNTY PRIOR 
TO THE CITY'S ANNEXATION OF THE PROPERTY. 
The City's planning staff has claimed that Statewide had illegally obtained 
its business license from Salt Lake County. R. 120-121. However, the City has totally 
and completely failed to specify how or in what manner the license was obtained 
illegally. It has simply made a blanket statement, without providing reasons or pointing 
to ordinances or giving any evidence to back up that statement. 
The City has totally failed to address the fact that Statewide legally and 
lawfully operated a home business in an A-1 zone, authorized under the zoning 
regulations of Salt Lake County (R. 238-241, 243; Add. 6), both prior to the annexation 
of the property by South Salt Lake City and at the present time. The County's regulations 
pertaining to A-1 agricultural zones clearly state that "home occupations" are permitted as 
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conditional uses in the A-l zone. The ordinance does not define "home occupation"; it 
simply and unequivocally states, "home occupation." Addendum 2. 
The nature of Statewide's business is quite plainly articulated in the name 
of the business, i.e., "Statewide Bail Bonds." Statewide made no attempt to disguise the 
nature of the business~the County knew what type of business it was licensing when it 
issued the license. Addendum 9. Statewide deposed Russell Lawson, the Manager of 
Salt Lake County Public Works Department, Planning and Development Services 
Division, who testified the County checked its records and ordinances, determined the 
business was appropriate as a home occupation in its location, and issued a license for the 
operation of Statewide Bail Bonds at its present location. Addenda 4, 5, and 6. 
At the time of this deposition, the City appeared to question the right of 
Mr. Lawson's department to issue the conditional use permit. Addendum 6, p. 25. 
Mr. Lawson testified that it was the policy of the department to do so in circumstances 
such as those presented by Statewide. This appellate court recently reviewed a similar 
situation in the case of Busche v. Salt Lake County, 2001 UT App 111,418 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), and specifically held that the Salt Lake County zoning 
ordinances, in the specific chapter governing the procedure for conditional use permit 
approval, authorized the planning commission to "delegate to the development services 
division director the authority to approve, modify or deny all or part of the conditional 
uses set forth in this title." Citing, Salt Lake County, Utah, Uniform Zoning Ordinance, 
13 
ch. 19.84.060. The City did not raise this point in its motion for summary judgment, but 
the case law appears to have made it moot, and lays to rest the City's claims that the 
license was obtained illegally. 
Statewide's business therefore lawfully existed at the time of the annexation 
of the property, and thus it is grandfathered, pursuant to §10-9-408, Utah Code 
Annotated, which provides simply and straightforwardly: "(1) (a) Except as provided in 
this section, a nonconforming use or structure may be continued." Since none of the 
subsequent provisions of § 10-9-408 are applicable in this case, the continued use is 
appropriate. Addendum 1. 
Statewide contends that the home occupation is still legal in the A-l zone, 
as it exists and is defined in the ordinances of South Salt Lake City, so that it is actually 
not a nonconforming use, but whether or not the present business license authorities are in 
agreement as to the proper interpretation of the statute, the business's grandfathered status 
is recognized by law and has constitutional protections against "taking" by the City. 
The Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in the case of Thomas S. 
"Steve " and Nancy C. Brown, et ah, v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, et ah (957 P.2d 
207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)), wherein Sandy City's Community Development Staff began 
interpreting the Sandy City Code as prohibiting rental of any single-family dwelling for 
fewer than thirty days, although the Code defined only occupancy of the dwellings within 
the city, and not the duration of that occupancy. The appellate court affirmed that it must 
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construe existing zoning ordinances strictly against the city, and found that since short-
term leases of residential properties were not prohibited by the zoning ordinance, they 
were permissible. Justice Bench added the comment that Sandy had taken the position 
that: 
. . . every use of property is prohibited unless the use is specifically permitted by 
ordinance. That approach to zoning is diametrically opposed to the common law 
followed in Utah. See, e.g., Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 
P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating zoning ordinances are to be strictly 
construed against the municipality because they are "in derogation of a property 
owner's common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property"). 
Id., at 213. Thus, short-term rentals were permitted in Sandy unless the city passed an 
ordinance to specifically prohibit them. 
The situation herein is clearly analogous: Neither Salt Lake County nor the 
City of South Salt Lake presently prohibits bail-bonding companies from being operated 
within A-l zones as "home occupations." Addenda 2, 3. The South Salt Lake City 
zoning ordinance does not cover bonding companies anywhere (at least, it did not in 
1999, although the ordinance may have been amended since the time of Statewide's 
application). Bonding companies are not excluded in any zone; they are not listed as 
belonging in any zone. Absent such a prohibition, the statutes must be construed as 
allowing bail-bonding companies in A-l zones. A review of the ordinances would 
suggest that bail-bonding companies would most appropriately be placed in light 
industrial zones, but they are not inappropriate in an A-l zone. 
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A similar case came before the Utah Court of Appeals in 1999, wherein 
Woods Cross City argued that Hugoe Trucking's use of its property was never legally 
established, and therefore could not qualify as a legal nonconforming use. The appellate 
court disagreed, finding that when Hugoe purchased the property it was zoned so that a 
"transfer company" was included within a list of forty-nine permitted uses. The court 
noted: 
Although transfer company is not defined in the ordinance, it is typically held to 
include "any company in the business of transporting freight or other products for 
hire." [Citation omitted.] Moreover, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation 
of a property owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, 
provisions therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed . . . in favor 
of the property owner." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 
602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The trial court thus correctly determined that 
"Hugoe Trucking is a 'transfer company' within the meaning of [the city's] prior 
zoning ordinance." Hence, because transfer company is a permitted use under the 
former C-2 ordinance, appellees' use of the property "legally existed before its 
current zoning designation." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(l)(l)(i) (Supp. 1999). 
Accordingly, appellees' use of the property meets the definition of nonconforming 
use, and the change from C-2 to 1-1 does not affect their right to continue using the 
property just as they had before the zoning change. 
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
The instant case is again analogous: Statewide obtained a business license 
from Salt Lake County as a home occupation, a conditional use in an A-l agricultural 
zone. No matter how South Salt Lake City may define a "home occupation," the granting 
of the license by the County conferred upon Statewide the status of "legally existing." If 
the City differs in its definition of "home occupation," it needs to legislate the meaning it 
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desires the term to convey, and thus change the meaning of the zoning ordinance, but 
Statewide will still then be entitled to continue as a valid nonconforming use. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS HAD FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY FAILING TO SEEK 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BY THE BUSINESS LICENSE 
HEARING BOARD OF CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE OF THE 
DENIED BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION. 
The City presented little evidence in support of its claim that Statewide 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies for denial of its business license application 
and that the trial court was therefore deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. The exhibits 
submitted by the City in support of this claim were: 
(1) Chapter 19.48.01 through .05 of the Salt Lake County Zoning 
Ordinance (Addendum 2); 
(2) The business license issued to Statewide by Salt Lake County (R. 
119; Addendum 9); 
(3) The July 2, 1999, letter to Statewide from officials of the City (R. 
120-121; Addendum 10); and 
(4) South Salt Lake City Ordinance § 5.02.190A (setting forth the 
methodology for appealing the denial, revoking, or rescinding of a business license) 
(Addendum 3). 
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Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 19.48 
Chapter 19.48 of the County's zoning regulations identify permitted and 
conditional uses in A-1 agricultural zones. Addendum 2. The regulations clearly include 
"home occupations" as conditional uses in the A-1 zone. The ordinance does not define 
"home occupation"; it simply and unequivocally states, "home occupation." Addendum 
2. 
The nature of Statewide's business is plainly articulated in the name of the 
business, i.e., "Statewide Bail Bonds." Statewide made no attempt to disguise the nature 
of the business—the County knew what type of business it was licensing when it issued 
the license. R. 119, 189. Prior to the oral argument on the parties' counter motions for 
summary judgment, Statewide deposed Russell Lawson, the Manager of the Salt Lake 
County Public Works Department, Planning and Development Services Division (see 
Addendum 6 for deposition transcript), who testified that on July 23, 1998, Ty Webber 
made application for a business license for Statewide Bail Bonds (Deposition, pp. 8, 9, 
10, 12, 29, 32); the County checked the zoning map {id., pp. 8, 21), determined that 
under the zoning ordinance the business was appropriate as a home occupation in its 
location (id., pp. 8. 17-18, 24-25), and issued approval for the authorized operation of 
Statewide Bail Bonds at its present location (id, p. 9, 14-15). Mr. Lawson testified that 
no other procedures were required; that the business was not of a type that required 
application or appearance before a planning and zoning commission or other review 
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board and that it was the policy of the County that his department had the power to grant 
the permit and issue the license (id., pp. 10, 16, 25-26); that his department followed 
normal procedures when it issued Statewide's license (id., pp. 10, 16, 25-26, 30); and that 
the license was appropriately issued in the ordinary course of his department's operations 
(id., pp. 16, 32-34). Mr. Lawson also testified that his department began using a new 
computer system in April of 1998 and that they had a lot of trouble with the new system, 
so that it was not until November 4 that the actual hard copy of the license was printed 
out (id., pp. 13, 31, 32-33), but his department considered Statewide's business to be 
authorized and the business license to be effective as of July 23, 1998 (id., pp. 11, 14, 15, 
35-36). 
The City has presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of 
Mr. Lawson; in fact, the City objected to Statewide's motion for continuance of the oral 
argument, which would have allowed the taking of other depositions, and insisted that the 
oral arguments proceed using the evidence then existing. R. 395-406. Mr. Lawson's 
uncontroverted testimony therefore stands: His department followed its usual policies 
and issued a business license to Statewide that had been in effect for one and one-half 
months before Statewide's property was annexed into the City. 
As explained by Mr. Lawson, the Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance 
supports and authorizes the issuance of Statewide's business license. At the very least 
this testimony presents a genuine issue of fact that precludes the entry of summary 
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judgment in this matter. At most, it establishes the grandfathered status of Statewide's 
business operation, which precludes the City's interference in the business. This item of 
evidence does not support the City's position. 
The business license issued to Statewide by Salt Lake County 
The actual printed copy of Statewide's business license bears the date of 
issuance of November 4, 1998 (Add. 9), which would appear to support the City's claims 
that it was illegally issued. However, the testimony provided by Russell Lawson by letter 
(Addendum 4), by affidavit (Addendum 5), and finally in his deposition (Addendum 6), 
explains that the printed date bore no relationship to the date on which the business 
application was actually approved. To the contrary, all the other evidence explains that 
the November 4 date only appeared because of problems with a new computer program. 
The other information appearing on the face of the license shows that Ty 
Webber revealed that he wished to operate a bail-bonding business at his home location, 
and that the business was a "mail and phone" home occupation, approved by the County 
Zoning Department. The business license therefore gives no support to the City's claims. 
The July 2, 1999, letter to Statewide from the City 
This letter actually supports Statewide's position, not the City's. In this 
letter (Add. 10), the City states that the business license issued by the County was "in 
violation of the zoning regulations of the County and should NOT have been issued" and 
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that an "A-l zone . . . does NOT allow business of your type (the same as the County)." 
These statements are unsubstantiated and without foundation, and were repudiated by the 
letter, affidavit, and deposition testimony of Russell Lawson. 
Of more importance, however, this letter does not follow the requirements 
set forth in the City's own ordinances regarding denial, rescinding, or revoking of a 
business license. South Salt Lake City ordinance § 5.02.170 (Addendum 3) states: 
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a business license application or 
business license, thee business license official shal cause written notice to be given 
by personal service or registered mail to the applicant or licensee of his or her 
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an application or license. Such notice shall 
include the reasons for the denial, suspension or revocation of such application or 
license, and shall include any accompanying documentation relating to the 
business license official's decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application or 
business license. Such notice shall also include a description, if applicable, of the 
applicant's or licensee's right to appeal the decision of the business license 
official. (Italics added.) 
This letter from South Salt Lake City to Statewide effectively gave 
Statewide a conditional license, good through December 31, 1999, subject only to 
conditions set forth on an inspection report. Addendum 10. There was no official denial 
of Statewide's application, no statement that the license was being suspended or revoked, 
and no notice of a right to appeal the decision. This letter did not state how Statewide's 
business license issued by the County was in violation of the zoning regulations; it was 
not a denial of a current business license application; and it did not contain a notice to 
Statewide of the proper forum for appealing a denial of a business license. 
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Furthermore, the City has made a de facto admission in its "Statement of 
Facts" of its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment (R. 105), that 
this notice was not personally served upon Statewide, nor was it sent by registered mail, 
nor did it contain a notice of Statewide's right to appeal and the timing and methodology 
for taking such an appeal, so that the notice did not comply with the City's own 
ordinances. R. 245,112. 
Violation of the City's ordinance makes its decision illegal under § 10-9-
1001 (Utah Code Annotated) and as interpreted in the Springville Citizens case (loc. cit). 
In another recent zoning case, Hatch v. Boulder Town Council (2001, UT App 55, 415 
Utah Adv, Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)), this appellate court held that when the Town of 
Boulder failed to "comply strictly" with the statutory requirements in enacting its zoning 
ordinance, its ordinance was invalid. By the same reasoning, when the City of South Salt 
Lake filed to "comply strictly" with its business license ordinance, its denial of a business 
license was invalid. The City's notice was defective in its manner of service and in its 
content, making the notice invalid and precluding the City from prevailing on this point. 
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POINT III. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF THE REZONE 
APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND 
CONDONED AN ILLEGAL REVERSE SPOT ZONE OF THE AREA 
IN WHICH APPELLANTS' PROPERTY IS SITUATED. 
The entire area around Statewide's property is commercial or light 
industrial. R. 362; 247, Tf 20. Directly across the street to the east and south is the 
County's new adult detention center, the County's new "call center," and a new Sheriffs 
substation, all authorized as conditional public uses in the A-l zone. Also located in the 
area are a Youth Detention Center, and two facilities used by the Utah Transit Authority. 
These new facilities are most compatible within a light industrial zone, and the zoning of 
the area has been modified to reflect that, including the area on the east side of 900 West, 
across the street from Statewide's property. 
In an oversight, perhaps, but as a major inconsistency with its previous 
practices, the County did not include the west side of 900 West in the new light industrial 
zone. A review of the zoning map (R. 326) reveals that virtually every other street in the 
South Salt Lake City area that is presently zoned for business or industrial use includes 
such a designation for both sides of the street. The west side of 900 West appears to be 
perhaps the only exception to this practice. However, this is not the only example of the 
arbitrary, capricious nature of the City's decision to deny Statewide's rezoning 
application. 
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The Planning and Zoning Commission voted to recommend denial (R. 128) 
of the application on four grounds: (1) rezoning would not conform to the General Plan 
(although the area is surrounded on three sides by light industrial and business zones (R. 
247,120; 326)); (2) rezoning would amount to spot zoning (although it is actually the 
small patch of agricultural property in the midst of a sea of business and industrial usages 
that constitutes the spot zoning (R. 324)); (3) the city should retain the remaining 
agricultural land in its boundaries as agricultural (although none of the property located 
along 900 West is presently being used as agricultural land (R. 324), the typical zoning in 
the City includes the properties lining both sides of the City's streets (R. 326)~so that 
only the property actually located directly behind Statewide's property is actual 
agricultural in nature, which would not be affected by Statewide's request for rezoning of 
the frontage property); and (4) two-thirds of the City contains other property zoned to 
permit a bail-bonding business (ignoring the fact that the County's new adult detention 
center is located directly across the street from Statewide's property (R. 324) and it is to 
the public's general good that bail bonding businesses be proximate to detention 
facilities). 
Since Salt Lake County built a correctional facility in the area, relocated 
other law-enforcement activities in the area, and issued a license to Statewide's bail-
bonding company, the character of that area was clearly envisioned by the County to be 
appropriate for bail-bonding activities and, accordingly, subject to rezoning to permit the 
24 
same, all of which gives rise to an arguable position that the City's position should be (or 
might ought to be) the same. The very fact that the City's position is not the same 
provides prima facie evidence that its decision was not based upon the evidence of the 
actual usage of the area, with an eye to the ongoing development and future expansion of 
the County's facilities, with appropriate accessory activities, so that the City's position 
was clearly not based upon the evidence. 
Although the City is entitled to use its discretion in its choice of land use, it 
is not entitled to infringe upon the rights of citizens who made life-affecting decisions 
based upon the County's avowed position. The City's discretion must be reasonably 
related to serving the public health, safety or general welfare. "If a land use restriction is 
unreasonable or irrational, it may be found to violate the substantive component of the 
due process clause." 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, § 3 A.04 
(4th ed. 1996), as cited in Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). Since the County (with its century-long jurisdiction over the area, its 
studies finding the area to be the proper situs for the detention facilities and other 
correctional activities, and its verbal encouragement to bail-bonding companies to 
relocate nearby) found Statewide's use of its property as a bail-bonding company to be 
reasonable and rational, the City's countermanding of the County must be seen as 
unreasonable and irrational or, in other words, arbitrary and capricious. 
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The City refers to opposition of owners of agricultural property in the area, 
but fails to distinguish between those property owners residing along 900 West-
contiguous to the light industrial zone—and those along 1000 West who are the only 
persons actually engaging in agricultural activities in the neighborhood. Even if the 900 
West residents opposed the zoning change (which they did not), a property owner 
has no vested right to "continuity of zoning...." A person who purchases land in 
reliance upon its current zoning restrictions acquires no right that the restrictions 
remain the same. 
Young, op cit., § 4.28, at 325, 327 (4th ed. 1996), as cited in Smith, loc. cit. 
As stated above, this area is clearly one whose character has materially 
changed and was materially changed prior to its annexation by South Salt Lake, with the 
huge building activity that is ongoing even to date, and to not have the area zoned in 
conformity with the reality of what exists (but rather to create an arbitrary zone, ignoring 
the reality of what exists) is again spot zoning and constitutes an arbitrary and capricious 
decision. 
The City rightly stated in its memorandum the holding in Crestview-
Holladay Homeowners Ass % Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., (545 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah 
1976)), that spot zoning consists of a smaller area being singled out of a larger area and 
specially zoned for a classification totally different from that of the surrounding land. 
What the City has ignored, however, is that the surrounding land on three sides is 
commercial or light industrial in usage (R. 324, 326), and is presently becoming even 
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more developed, so that leaving the west side of 900 West with an agricultural 
designation is causing the actual spot zoning. It is not Statewide's property that is the 
incongruity; it is the small strip of five houses along the west side of 900 West that stand 
out as the last vestige of an older agrarian use that has ceased to exist along that street-a 
spot of former agricultural use in a sea of commerce. 
Additionally, the City's denial of the zoning request also did not properly 
consider the general welfare of the residents of the area: Prisoners are let out of the 
detention center at all hours of the day and night, being left to walk up and down the 
street. Such a situation is better for a commercial establishment than for homeowners, 
event Ty Webber is both. From the concept of protecting a family, 
bonded prisoners would be better not walking through a neighborhood of homeowners 
but through a neighborhood of bail bondsmen. 
Another aspect of the public's general welfare concerns the constitutional 
entitlement of arrestees to be released from incarceration through the posting of bond. It 
is appropriate for this bonding/bailing activity to take place proximate to the jail (as was 
clearly evidenced by the location of bonding businesses near the old Salt Lake County 
Jail in downtown Salt Lake City), and it is obviously more convenient for family 
members or other interested parties to be able to make bail arrangements in facilities 
located close to the detention center. 
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CONCLUSTON 
Salt Lake County acknowledged the operation of Statewide's business as 
appropriate, proper, and legal in its present location, and its approval gave Statewide a 
grandfathered status. For the City to decide otherwise is arbitrary and capricious, and its 
manner of conveying its decision was illegal and did not conform to its own statutes, 
making the decision invalid. 
DATED this ?$ day of August, 2001. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by 
depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed 
to: 
H. Craig Hall 
South Salt Lake City Attorney 
220 East Morris Avenue 
South Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
on this lp day of August, 2001. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
§ 10-9-408, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 10-9-408, Utah Code Annotated 
10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or 
structure may be continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same 
building, provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or 
made for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy 
device to a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or 
amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, 
alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms 
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, 
by providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which 
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by 
acquiring the billboard and associated properly rights through: 
(i) gift; 
(ii) purchase; 
(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining, 
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or 
vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent 
domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v). 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may 
remove a billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner 
with reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the 
legislative body finds that: 
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or 
misleading statement in his application; 
(b) the billboard is unsafe; 
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or 
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months. 
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school 
district property when the property ceases to be used for school district purposes. 
ADDENDUM 2 
§ 19.48.010, etseq., Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance 
19.4S.010 
Chapter 19.48 
A-l AGRICULTURAL ZONE 
Sections: 
19.48.010 
19.48.020 
19.48.030 
19.48.040 
19.48.050 
19.48.060 
19.48.070 
19.48.080 
19.48.090 
Purpose of provisions. 
Permitted uses. 
Conditional uses. 
Lot area. 
Lot •width-
Front yard. 
Side yard-
Rear yard. 
Building height. 
19.48.010 Purpose of provisions. 
The purpose of the A-1 zone is to provide areas 
in the county for low-density residential develop-
ment, together with limited agricultural uses. (Prior 
code § 22-23-1) 
19.48.020 Permitted uses. 
Permitted uses in the A-l zone include: 
— Accessory uses and buildings customarily 
incidental to permitted uses; 
— Agriculture; 
— Animals and fowl for family food production; 
— Apiary; 
— Aviary; 
— Farm devoted to the raising and marketing, 
on a commercial scale, of chickens, turkeys or other 
fowl or poultry, rabbits, chinchilla, beaver, nutria, 
fish or frogs; 
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section 
19.04.293; 
— Household pets; 
— Raising and grazing of horses, cattle, sheep 
or goals, provided that such raising or grazing is not 
a pan of, nor conducted in conjunction with, any 
livestock feedyard, livestock sales yard, animal 
byproduct business, or commercial riding academy; 
— Residential facility for elderly persons; 
— Single-family dwelling; 
— Worm farming (minimum lot area one acre). 
(Ord. 1200 § 5 (part), 1992; Ord. 1179 § 5 (part), 
1992; 1986 Recodification; § 1 (pan) of Ord. passed 
2/1/84; prior code § 22-23-2) 
19.48.030 Conditional uses. 
Conditional uses in the A-l zone include: 
— Airport; 
— Bed and breakfast homestay; 
— Campgrounds; 
— Cemetery; 
— Day care/preschool center, subject to Section 
19.76.260 of this title; 
— Dwelling group. 
A. The parcel of ground on which the dwelling 
group, as defined in Section 19.04.190 of this title, 
is to be erected shall have an area equal to the ag-
gregate of the minimum lot areas otherwise required 
in fiie zone for the number of individual dwelling 
structures in the group. 
B. The distance between the principal buildings 
shall be equal to the total side yards required in the 
zone; provided, however, thai at the option of the 
developer, the distance between the principal struc-
tures may be reduced to ten feet, provided that the 
difference between ten feet and the required side 
yards is maintained as permanently landscaped open 
space elsewhere on the site. The distance between 
principal buildings and the nearest perimeter lot line 
shall not be less than fifteen feet unless demonstrat-
ed by the development plan that the yard required 
for a principal building in the district in which lo-
cated is more appropriate. The distance between the 
building and a public street shall be not less than the 
front yard required in the zoning district, except for 
comer lots the side yard which faces on a public 
street shall be not less than twenty feet. 
C. Access shall be provided by a private street 
or right-of-way from a public street; the private 
street or right-of-way shall not be less than twenty 
feet wide for one or two rear dwelling units and not 
less than thirty feet wide for three or more dwelling 
units. 
D. A minimum of two parking spaces shall be 
provided for each dwelling unit. Parking spaces and 
vehicular maneuvering areas shall be designed to 
comply with county standards. 
iy.4s.u.ju 
E. Every dwelling in the dwelling group shall be 
within sixty feet of an access roadway or drive. 
F. The development plan shall provide a buffer 
landscaped area along all property lines and decora-
tive landscaping adjacent to the buildings in appro-
priate locations. Solid visual bairier fences shall be 
provided along all property lines unless the planning 
commission approves otherwise by deleting or mod-
ifying the fence requirement 
G. The development shall be approved by the 
development services director and the county fire 
chief before final approval is given by the planning 
commission. 
— Fruit and/or vegerihle stand, provided thai the 
products aie produced on the premises; 
— Golf course; 
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section 
19.04293; 
— Home occupation; 
— Milk processing and sale, provided that at 
least fifty percent of the milk processed or sold is 
produced on the premises; 
— Nursery and/or greenhouse, excluding retail 
sales; 
— Nursing home; 
— Pigeons, subject to city-county health depart-
ment health regulations; 
— Planned unit development; 
— Plant for storage or packing of fiuit or vege-
tables produced on the premises; 
— Private educational institution having an 
academic curriculum sinTifar to thaf ordinarily given 
in public schools; 
— Private nonprofit recreational grounds and 
facilities; 
— Public and quasi-public uses; 
— Radio and television transmitting and relay 
station and tower, excluding business office or stu-
dio, except such control room studio facilities as 
required for emergency broadcasts in the event of 
a national or local disaster; 
— Residential health care facility for up to five 
residents on streets less than eighty feet in width, 
and up to ten residents on street eighty feet and 
wider, excluding the facility operator and his/her 
related family with a maximum of one nonresident 
pan-time relief employee on the premises at any one 
time unless additional staffing is required by the 
Utah Department of Health, which use shall not 
change the residential appearance and character of 
the property; 
— Sportsman's kennel (minimum lot area one 
acre); 
— Temporary buildings for uses incidental to 
construction work, which buildings must be re-
•moved upon completion or abandonment of the 
construction work. If such buildings are not re-
moved within ninety days upon completion of con-
struction and thirty days after notice, the buildings 
will be removed by the county at the expense of the 
owner; 
— Two-family dwelling. (Ori 1338 § 2 (pan), 
1996; Ord. 1198 § 8 (pan), 1992; Ord. 1179 § 6 
(pan), 1992; Ord. 1170 §§ 2 (pan), 3 (pan), 1991; 
Ord. 1118 § 5 (pan), 1990; Ord. 1088 § 5 (pan), 
1989; (pan) of Ord passed 12/15/82; Ord passed 
11/17/82; prior code § 22-23-3) 
19.4&040 Lot area. 
In the A-l zone, the minimum lot area for any 
dwelling, school, church, greenhouse, aviary or 
apiary, or for the keeping of animals and fowl for 
family food production, shall be ten thousand square 
feet. The minimum lot area for any fowl, poultry, 
rabbit, fish, chinchilla, beaver, nutria or frog farm, 
or for raising or grazing horses, cattle, sheep or 
goats (except as permitted for family food produc-
tion), or for packing or storage plants, shall be one 
acre. The minimum lot area for radio and television 
transmitting and relay stations and towers shall be 
four acres or more, such additional area to be suffi-
cient to pennit the placement of towers in such a 
manner that side clearance in every direction from 
each and every tower shall be equal to or greater 
than the height of the tower. (Prior code § 22-23-4) 
19,48-050 Lot width. 
In the A-l zone, the minimum width of any lot 
which is required by this chapter to contain a mini-
mum area of ten thousand square feet shall be 
(Sab L^e Cooaty 1-96) 628 
19.48.050 
sixty-five feeL The minimuin width of any lot which 
is required by this chapter to contain a minimum 
area of one acre shall be one hundred fesL The 
minimum width of any lot which is required by this 
ADDENDUM 3 
§ 5.02.170, South Salt Lake City Ordinances 
5.02.160 
C. The business license official shall have the 
authority, on his or her own initiative, or in re-
sponse to complaints from the public or any city 
departments, to investigate and gather evidence of 
violations of this code, or other circumstances which 
may give rise to a denial, suspension or revocation. 
Upon a finding that the business license application, 
or business license, may be denied, suspended or 
revoked for the reasons set forth above, the business 
license official may deny, suspend, or revoke such 
application or license. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A 
(pan))) 
5.02-170 Notice of denial, suspension or 
revocation. 
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a 
business license application or business license, the 
business license official shall cause written notice 
to be given by personal service or registered mail to 
the applicant or licensee of his or her decision to 
deny, suspend or revoke an application or license. 
Such notice shall include the reasons for the denial, 
suspension or revocation of such application or li-
cense, and shall include any accompanying docu-
mentation relating to the business license official's 
decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application 
or business license. Such notice shall also include 
a description, if applicable, of the applicant's or 
licensee's right to appeal the decision of the busi-
ness license official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part))) 
5.02,180 Business license hearing board. 
There is created a business license hearing board 
of the city of South Salt Lake which shall consist of 
three members, and such alternates as deemed ap-
propriate, appointed by the mayor, with the advice 
and consent of the city council. The board shall 
consist of one member of the city council, one 
resident of the city of South Salt Lake, and one 
holder of a business license, or one having substan-
tial interest in a business license issued by the city 
of South Salt Lake, who is not a party to an appeal. 
Members of the South Salt Lake business license 
hearing board shall be appointed for two-year terms 
or until their successors are appointed, and shall 
serve without compensation. Upon an initial ap-
pointment by the mayor, with the advice and con-
sent of the city council, one board member, as di-
rected by the mayor, shall serve for a one-year term. 
Thereafter, each appointment shall be for two years 
for each member of the board. The business license 
hearing board shall have the authority to hear evi-
dence and business license matters referred to the 
board, and after such hearing, shall submit its rec-
ommendations in writing to the office of the mayor. 
The mayor shall designate one member of the board 
to be chairman and one member of the board to be 
vice chairman for a period of one year. (Ord. 97-23 
§ 1 (Att. A (part))) 
5.02.190 Procedures for appeal. 
A. A person may appeal a decision of the busi-
ness license official to deny, suspend or revoke a 
business license by filing written notice of appeal, 
directed to the business license hearing board, and 
filed with the city recorder, within ten working days 
of the date of the business license official's notice 
to deny, suspend or revoke the business license 
application or business license. 
B. The notice of appeal shall be in writing, and 
shall set forth specifically the grounds and reasons 
why the business license application or business 
license should not be denied, suspended or revoked. 
(Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (pan))) 
5.02.200 Business license hearing. 
A. The hearing shall be a time, place and date 
set by the business license hearing board, but not 
later than ten working days following receipt of the 
applicant's or licensee's notice of appeal. 
B. The business license official, or his or her 
representative or attorney, shall first present any 
evidence upon which the business license official's 
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an applicant's 
or licensee's application or business license was 
based. 
1. The applicant or licensee, in person or 
through his or her attorney, may then present any 
evidence which shows the business license official's 
decision was in error. 
AAS (City of South Salt Lake 4^g) 
2. All witnesses shall be sworn to testify truth-
Uy, and either party is entitled to confront and 
oss examine any witnesses. 
3. All evidence shall be recorded by a certified 
>urt reporter and constitute a record of proceedings 
' the business license hearing board. 
C. The laws and ordinances of the city of South 
lit Lake, the state of Utah and the United Slates 
iall in all appeals be controlling. The business 
:ense hearing board shall not make any findings 
hich would result in the violation of, or continuing 
olation of, any of the above laws and ordinances, 
le business license hearing board shall not have 
e authority to waive compliance with any of the 
jplicable provisions of the business license ordi-
mce, nor can the business \1c2nse hearing board 
:tend deadlines set forth in such ordinances or 
lange the substance or form of such ordinances. 
)rd. 97-23 § 1 (Art. A (pan))) 
02.210 Business license hearing board 
decision. 
Tne business license hearing board, after receiv-
g all evidence presented by all parties, shall render 
decision to either uphold the denial, revocation or 
spension of a business license application or busi-
es license within seven days from the date of such 
taring. Such decision shall be in writing, and shall 
elude the findings of fact and conclusions by the 
isiness license hearing board. The business license 
taring board may direct a prevailing party to draft 
ich findings of fact and conclusions, and also re-
lire an order to accompany such findings of fact 
id conclusions. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part))) 
02.220 Appeal of business license hearing 
board decision. 
Any decision of the business license hearing 
)ard may be appealed by the applicant, licensee or 
e city to the third district court within thirty (30) 
Lys from the date the business license hearing 
)ard submits its written decision. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 
t^L A (part))) 
5.02.230 Unlawful to engage in business 
after revocation. 
If any license shall be revoked or application for 
license be denied as provided in this tide, it shall 
thereafter be unlawful for any person to open, oper-
ate, maintain, manage or conduct any business, 
trade, profession or calling for which a license is 
required at the premises where the license was re-
voked or denied until a new license shall be granted 
by the city. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part))) 
5.02.240 Issuance of new license after 
denial or revocation—Waiting 
period. 
No person who has been denied a license or 
whose license has been revoked, and no person 
associated or connected with such a person in the 
conduct of his business, shall be granted a new 
license until a period of six months after such denial 
or revocation has elapsed except with approval of 
the business license official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (An. 
A (part))) 
5.02.250 Subject to general licensing 
provisions. 
The licenses required in the consolidated fee 
schedule are specifically subject to all of the general 
licensing provisions as set forth in this title. (Ord. 
97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part))) 
5.02.260 Fees required not additional. 
The fees required under this chapter are not in 
addition to other fees required in this title; only one 
license is required for each business, except as set 
forth in Section 5.02.020 providing for late penalties 
on all licenses. It is realized that many of the busi-
nesses paying a license under this chapter are con-
trolled and regulated by the state of Utah and Salt 
Lake County, and insofar as the state and the county 
require additional licenses or inspection fees, the 
fees required hereunder are in addition to such fees 
and are not in lieu thereof. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (AtL A 
(part))) 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Letter of Russell Lawson, dated February 29, 2000 
Salt Lake County Public Works Department 
Planning and Development Services Division 
Mary Callaghan, Commissioner 
J. D. Johnson, Department Director SALT LUKE COUNTY 
Calv in K. Schneller, A.I.C.R, Division Director 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N3600 
February 29, 2000 S a l t U k e C i t y 
J
 Utah 84190-4200 
To Whom it Mav Concern: 
Tei (801)468-2000 
Fax (801)468-2169 
The business license for Statewide Bail Bonds became effective on July 23, 1998. 
The business license was not printed until November 4, 1998 due to problems incurred during 
converting from one computer program to another. As far as Salt Lake County is concerned. 
Statewide Bail Bonds was legally conducting business in Salt lake county in July, 1998. 
If you have any farther questions, please contact our office. 
[Utd^fa F&iMi^ 
RUSSELL LAWSON, MANAGER 
ADDENDUM 5 
Affidavit of Russell Lawson, dated May 5, 2000 

RANDALL T. GAITHER (#1141) 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535) 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone. (801)466-6311 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE, 
BAIL BONDS 
Plaintiff, ; 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL LAWSON 
1 Case No 000901508 
Hon William B Bohling 
The undersigned, Russell Lawson, being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows: 
1 I am the Manager of the Salt Lake County Public Works Department, Planning and 
Development Services Division, located at 2001 South State Street, Suite N-3600, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2.1 am personally aware of the facts in relation to the application of Statewide Bail Bonds 
for a business license at the location of 3350 South 900 West, South Salt Lake City, 
Utah(account number 37430). 
3. When the application for the business license was received at Salt Lake County, the 
application as part of the standard procedure was submitted to the Zoning Department and 
Zoning checked the application and the license and business use set forth in the license was 
approved for Statewide Bail Bonds at the above referenced address under Salt Lake County 
Zoning regulations. 
4. If the business use did not comply with the zoning for the real property, then Zoning 
would have not approved the business license at the site. Therefore under Salt Lake County's 
interpretation of the zoning ordinances that existed in July 1998, the business use of Statewide 
Bail Bonds was a lawful use which Salt Lake County specifically approved. 
5. After annexation all the original files including the application and all business licenses 
were forwarded to South Salt Lake City in order that they would be aware of the licenses that had 
been issued by the County. 
6. I am aware of other annexations in Salt Lake County by other cities such as 
Taylorsville, and after annexations, the licenses from the County have been honored by the new 
municipality. 
DATED this ^Mjj day of May, 2000. 
RUSSELL LAWSON 
2 
State of Utah ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the day of May, 2000, personally appeared before me Russell Lawson 
who having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true 
accordmg to the best of information and belief and has executed the same. 
fcPTARY PUBLIC 
KATMNAYUKOH-EKE 
XV; 2001 So State #N-3600 
;:) Salt Lake Crty UT 84190 
*y My Commission Expires 
' January 28 2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Seal: 
3 
ADDENDUM 6 
Condensed Transcript/Index of Deposition of 
Russell Lawson, dated September 15,2000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TY WEBBER AND 
BAIL BONDS, 
VS. 
CITY OF SOUTH 
STATEWIDE ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
SALT LAKE, ) 
DEFENDANTS. ) 
CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT/INDEX 
CASE NO. 000901508 
DEPOSITION OF RUSSELL L. LAWSON 
TAKEN; SEPTEMBER 15, 2 000 
File No. 91500 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
5980 South Fashion Blvd. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
263-1396 
REPORTED BY: 
KELLY SOMMERVILLE, RPR 
Condenselt 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Deposition of RUSSELL L. LAWSON, taken on behalf of 
Plaintiff, at the law offices of WILLIAMS & HUNT, 257 
East 200 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
September 15, 2000, commencing at 8:30 a.m., before 
KELLY SOMMERVILLE, Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant to 
Notice. 
APPEARANCES: 
FCR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
BY: WILLIAM B. PARSONS III, 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
ESQ. 
FOR MR. LAWSON: 
ALSO PRESENT: 
BY: H. CRAIG HALL, ESQ. 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
220 East Morris Avenue, #200 
South Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
BY: DENNIS C. FERGUSON, ESQ. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BY: RENA BECKSTEAD, ESQ. 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
TY WEBBER 
Page 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah, September 15, 2000, 8:30 a.m. 
2 BY MR. PARSONS: 
3 Q. Mr. Lawson, I'm the attorney for Mr. Webber 
4 here, and we have an action pending against South Salt 
5 Lake relative to a zoning issue. It doesn't involve 
6 Salt Lake County, other than the fact that it used to be 
7 property that was in Salt Lake County. And you may or 
8 may not have some knowledge that would be relevant to m> 
9 litigation, so I've asked to be able to interview you 
10 this morning. 
11 A. Okay. 
12 Q. In this deposition, the young lady to my right 
13 will take your responses down. She does that by keying 
14 this machine and she can't do that very well if I speak 
15 over the top of you or if you answer a question before 
16 I'm through asking it, so we'll try hard, I hope, to 
17 stay away from one another's words. 
18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. If you have a question about anything that I'm 
20 asking you at any point during the course of the 
21 deposition, don't hesitate to ask me. I have a bad 
22 habit of asking awkward questions, so if I do that, just 
23 let me know and I'll rephrase the question. If you need 
24 to speak to your counsel or you need to take a break or 
25 if there are any problems at any point in time, I have 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I N D E X 
WITNESS EXAMINATION BY 
Russell Lawson Mr. Parsons 
Mr. Hall 
Mr. Parsons 
EXHIBITS: 
No. 1 Affidavit 
No. 2 SV-MISC Licence Application 
No. 3 Busxness Card for Linda Kingsley 
No. 4 Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance 
No. 5 Business License 
No. 6 Letter Dated 2/29/00 
No. 7 Salt Lake County Zoning Map 
No. 8 Salt Lake County Business License 
Application 
PAG 
4 
24 
39 
6 
12 
16 
17 
18 
20 
21 
26 
Page 
1 no objection. That's perfectly okay with me. 
2 The record is something I will be using during the 
3 course of my proceedings so it's very important I have a 
4 clear record. Accordingly, I would ask you not nod your 
5 head one way or the other, but say yes or no if those 
6 answers are appropriate and speak loud because I'm 
7 getting old and I'm hard of hearing. Now, that's about 
8 all that I have. Do you have any questions? 
9 A. No questions. 
10 Q. Great. Now, Mr. Lawson, I need to have you 
11 raise your right hand and be sworn in. 
12 (Whereupon witness was sworn.) 
13 RUSSELL L. LAWSON, 
14 having been duly sworn, was 
15 examined and testified as follows: 
16 BY MR. PARSONS: 
17 Q. Mr. Lawson, would you please tell me your full 
18 name? 
19 A. Russell L. Lawson. 
20 Q. The middle initial was what? 
21 A. Lee. 
22 Q. Mr. Lawson, what is your business address, sir? 
23 A. 2001 South State Street, Suite N3600. 
24 Q. N3600. Okay. And your business telephone 
Page 6 
1 A. 468-2174. 
2 Q. For whom do you work, sir? 
3 A. Salt Lake County Development Services. 
4 Q. And is that part of the Public Works 
5 Department? 
6 A. It is. 
7 Q. What is your position there? 
8 A. I 'm a business license manager. 
9 (Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.) 
10 BY MR. PARSONS: 
11 Q. Mr. Lawson, I want you to look at what has been 
12 marked as Exhibit No. 1 to this deposition, and ask if 
13 you can identify that document? 
14 MR. FERGUSON: what is Exhibit 1, Brad? 
15 MR. PARSONS: The affidavit of Russell Lawson. 
16 MR. FERGUSON: Okay. 
17 THE WITNESS: I recognize it, yes. 
18 BY MR. PARSONS: 
19 Q. Is that your signature on the second page, sir? 
20 A. It is. 
21 Q. Did you read and understand the contents of 
22 Exhibit 1 before signing the same? 
23 A. I understood them. 
24 Q. And are the representations contained in 
25 Exhibit 1 true and accurate to the best of your 
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1 knowledge? 
2 A. It's true. 
3 Q. Exhibit 1 speaks in terms of an application for 
4 a business license for Statewide Bail Bonds at a 
5 location of 3350 South 900 West in what was at the time 
6 of the application Salt Lake County. Do you recall any 
7 of the events surrounding that? 
8 A. Other than just it come across my desk, that's 
9 about it. 
10 Q. Okay. There's an account No. 37430 in 
11 reference to paragraph 2 of the affidavit. What does 
12 that account number refer to? 
13 A. That referred to the business license account 
14 we assign once it's finished. 
15 Q. Is that a number you participate in assigning 
16 or someone on your staff? 
17 A. Someone on my staff. 
18 Q. Very well. Does that account number refer to 
19 in fact Statewide Bail Bonds? 
20 A. It does. 
21 Q. Have you reviewed that to determine that that 
22 account number is accurately the one that pertains to 
23 Statewide Bail Bond? 
24 A. At the time it was assigned to Salt Lake County 
25 it was. 
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1 Q. Can you tell me when that account number was 
2 assigned? 
3 A. July 23, 1998. 
4 Q. What is the procedure, if you'd be so kind, 
5 explain that to me, sir, when a person seeks to have a 
6 business license acquired. 
7 A. Well, in this case, with this particular 
8 business, they come into the County, ask to apply for a 
9 business license. We ask them what is the location that 
10 they gonna do their business in. We in fact check our 
11 maps to make sure they're in the county. Once we find 
12 out they're in the county and what zone it is, we ask 
13 them what they are planning on doing, and they tell us 
14 what they are planning on doing and it may need a 
15 conditional use or we can sign off on it. 
16 In this particular case, it was in an A1 zone. He 
17 wanted to be doing a bail bond business with no 
18 customers or employees coming to the home. So, 
19 therefore, we gave him a business license application, a 
20 phone and mail permit, which he said, and filled both of 
21 them out, the business license application is just a 
22 standard application. He put down his business, the 
23 date he wanted to start operating it, the location of 
24 it, any employees and stuff like that, d/b/a, owner's 
25 name, owner's address and etc. He filled that out and 
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1 he signed that. 
2 The phone and mail application that he filled out 
3 was basically - I've got a copy of that. It's this 
4 application. It would state that the business is 
5 conducted in the home by a phone and/or mail. We asked 
6 him, Was it his home? He said it was, so, therefore, 
7 with a phone and mail — with a phone and mail, there is 
8 no customer or employees coming to the home. No 
9 vehicles, except the resident's own personal vehicle 
10 transportation, equipment or merchandise stock, no 
11 equipment or anything like that kept on the property. 
12 The only thing that can really be maintained on a phone 
13 and mail is just a desk, drafting table, home computer, 
14 answering service device, fax machine, and printer. And 
15 only the person residing in the home can be involved in 
16 the business and no accessory buildings can be involved 
17 on this permit. 
18 If they abide by those rules, we have them sign this 
19 application, zoning approve it, and then he brings it 
20 back to us. We receipt it and issue him a receipt to 
21 operate - start operating his business. 
22 Q. In the instance of Statewide Bail Bonds, do you 
23 know the date that the application was made? 
24 A. Date the application was made was July 23, 
25 1998. The date that they fill out the application and 
T>~~~ £ _ D o ™ * O 
Condenselt 
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1 give it to us is the date that we enter into the 
2 computer and that's the date we assign it as being a 
3 current license 
4 Q And so may I presume that on July 23 of 1998, a 
5 business license application was made by Statewide Bail 
6 Bonds to Salt Lake County? 
7 A Correct 
8 Q When was that approved7 
9 A Normally we can staff approve licenses right 
10 then and there As long as he agreed to abide by these 
11 rule, the staff approves them Once we issue him a 
12 license, they give him a receipt, we tell him he can 
13 operate his business We, therefore, send it to the 
14 County Commission for approval, and once the Commission 
15 approve it, we go ahead and print the license In this 
16 case, we probably didn't print a license because 
17 approximately 15th of April we started a new Hansen 
18 system And with that new Hansen system we started, we 
19 had so much troubles, we was not able to print licenses 
20 for some time 
21 Q Computer system wasn't up witn you, I presume9 
22 A It was a new system 
23 Q And eventually did the license in this instance 
24 get printed9 
25 A I think it did 
1 Page 11 
1 Q But as ol 7/23 of '98, was there a business 
2 license approved for Statewide Bail Bonds7 
3 A I would say probably within two weeks after 
4 that, because it takes about a week to put it to 
5 Commission and then it's approved by Commission Phone 
6 and mail businesses automatically approve 
7 MR FERGUSON I'll object, speculative 
8 BY MR PARSONS 
9 Q Do you happen to have any records relative to 
10 the application of Statewide Bail Bonds7 
11 A All records that we have pertaining to that 
12 particular file were transferred to South Salt Lake 
13 Q If I were to indicate to you that I had 
14 previously been told by South Salt Lake that they didn't 
15 have any records from Salt Lake County, would that be 
16 surprising to you7 
17 A I don't know All I know is when we - every 
18 time that part of Salt Lake County annexed into another 
19 jurisdiction, we automatically send that file to that 
20 jurisdiction so they will have a history of that 
21 business 
22 Q So, theoretically, South Salt Lake ought to 
23 have the historical record of the application of 
24 Statewide Bail Bonds' business license application 
Page 1 
1 A Correct 
2 Q All right Do you have, either through your 
3 records or your personal knowledge, knowledge that m 
4 fact Statewide Bail Bonds did make an application of 
5 July 23, 19987 
6 A Just going back, computer records is what we 
7 have right here, that they did make application 
8 Q So your computer records in fact verify the 
9 application having been made, is that correct, sir7 
10 A Right 
11 Q But you don't have any hard copies beyond that7 
12 A No 
13 Q Okay Because of the transfer to South Salt 
14 Lake7 
15 A That's correct 
16 Q Okay, thank you All right 
17 (Exhibit No 2 was marked for identification ) 
18 BY MR PARSONS 
19 Q Let me show you what's been marked as 
20 Deposition Exhibit No 2, sir, and ask you if you can 
21 identify that document for me Take your time, look it 
22 over 
23 A This is actually just a copy that were printed 
24 out from our computers saying that Statewide Bail Bonds, 
25 the location, the account number that it was processed 
Page 1 
1 on, states it was processed on July 23 at 1407, the 
2 issue date was 11/04/98 and expires 12/31/98 
3 Q Relative to the process date of 7/23/98, does 
4 that mean that's the date that the application was 
5 submitted7 
6 A Correct 
7 Q And the issue date of 11/4, does that mean that 
8 that is the date that the County Commission approved it7 
9 A No, that was probably the date that we 
10 actually, as I said earlier, we had problems when we 
11 started that new Hansen system, so we was having 
12 difficulty pnnting We had a big, mass printing in 
13 November, so we actually probably printed the hard copy 
14 of that license on that day 
15 MR FERGUSON objection again as to foundation 
16 BY MR PARSONS 
17 Q Okay, thank you Tell me, sir, speaking of 
18 foundation, are you familiar with this instrument7 
19 A Yes, this is the receipt 
20 Q And is the receipt -
21 A Actually, it's just a reprint of that 
22 particular file 
23 Q From your computer system7 
24 A From our computer system 
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1 County business records7 
2 A We don't - this is just - it's someone coming 
3 in and asking for a reprint of what's on the account on 
4 the record, then this is what this is. 
5 Q This is what they would receive? 
6 A Right 
7 Q So this is somelhmg that was acquired from 
8 someone from Salt Lake County? 
9 A After the fact. This is not a receipt that we 
10 would have gave him. 
11 Q At the time9 
12 A At that time, that particular time. 
13 Q I understand But this does show what your 
14 computer records indicate in a hard copy form; is that 
15 right, sir7 
16 A Correct 
17 Q Relative to the 7/23/98 day, is that the day 
18 that the business is entitled to go forward as though 
19 they have a proper business license9 
20 A Yes, correct 
21 Q If a business makes this application and they 
22 have done what you have explained to me this morning 
23 thus far, are they legally entitled to operate as a 
24 business? j 
25 MR HALL objection, that calls for a legal i 
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| 1 answer 
2 BY MR PARSONS 
3 Q Please, sir 
4 A Yes 
5 Q Yes, sir, thank you Now, there's a 
6 handwritten notation on the bottom of this form, can you 
7 tell me what that notation says9 
8 A It says "Apply for license 7/23/98, waiting 
9 for software change, punt license License was" - I 
10 can't make out what that was 
11 Q Could that be valid9 
12 A Yeah, "valid 7/23/98" 
13 Q Do you recognize the initials beside that9 
14 A That's Linda Kingsley 
15 Q Is she an employee of your department9 
16 A Yes, she is 
17 Q Is she authorized to make such a notation9 
18 A Right, that's our cashier and she receipted 
19 this particular application 
20 Q Kingsley, and by her initials on the bottom of 
21 this indicating that the license was valid on 7/23/98, 
22 would a property owner be entitled to presume that he 
23 was operating legally from that point forward9 
24 MR HALL Objection, calls for speculation, and he 
25 can't speculate as to what the property owner can assume 
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1 or expect 
2 BY MR PARSONS 
3 Q Well, I disagree entirely Please go ahead, 
4 sir, that's something for the judge to decide 
5 A The way our system is set up, when they pay 
6 their fees at that particular time, unless it's a 
7 commercial business dealing with alcohol or anything, 
8 we, in this particular instance, we would tell a phone 
9 and mail operator that he or she is entitled to operate 
10 Q Is there anything on Exhibit 2 that would 
11 indicate to you that Statewide's application for a 
12 business license was handled out of the norm9 
13 A No 
14 Q To the contrary then, does Exhibit 2 indicate 
15 to you that Statewide's business application was handled 
16 the way you were handling all applications at that point 
17 in tune? 
118 A It was 
19 (Exhibit No 3 was marked for identification ) 
20 BY MR PARSONS 
21 Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
22 Exhibit 3 to this deposition, sir, and ask you if you 
23 can identify that Xeroxed copy of a business card9 
24 A Yes 
25 Q And who is that9 
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1 A That's an employee of mine's, Linda Kingsley 
2 Q Is that same individual whose initials appear 
3 at the bottom of Exhibit No 29 
4 A It is 
5 Q And she was an employee of Salt Lake County 
6 during the month of July of 19989 
7 A That's correct 
8 Q Thank you, sir 
9 (Exhibit No 4 was marked for identification ) 
10 BY MR PARSONS 
11 Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
12 Deposition Exhibit No 4 and ask you if you can identify 
13 that document 
14 A It's the County Zoning Ordinance 
15 Q How do you know that's part of your County's 
16 Zoning Ordinance9 
17 A It's marked Salt Lake County at the bottom but 
18 we also deal with it every day 
19 Q Do you recognize it personally9 
20 A Yes 
21 Q Great Relative to the County Zoning Ordinance 
22 that is reflected by Deposition Exhibit 4, is this a 
23 County Zoning Ordinance that Statewide Bail Bonds 
24 operated under9 
25 A Correct 
Porro 14 - Parr** 17 
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1 Q Do the criteria for the operation of a home 
2 occupation appear in Depo Exhibit No 49 
3 A Not on the first page It would be on the 
4 second page in the conditional use which is a home 
5 occupation about midways down the page, item G 
6 Q But for purposes of my deposition, may I 
7 presume that I accurately state your position when I say 
8 that Exhibit 4 to your deposition, this instrument I've 
9 just handed you, is the Salt Lake County ordinance under 
10 which Statewide Bail Bonds was given a zoning permit — 
11 I mean a business license, is that right, sir'7 
12 A That's correct 
13 Q Thank you 
14 (Exhibit No 5 was marked for identification ) 
15 BY MR PARSONS 
16 Q I'm going to hand you what's been marked as 
17 Deposition Exhibit No 5, sir, and ask you if you can 
18 identify that document9 
19 A It's a copy of the Salt Lake County business 
20 license 
21 Q And for whom is this business license issued9 
22 A Statewide Bail Bondsman 
23 Q Is this identified by an account number9 
24 A It is 
25 Q What is that account number9 
1 Page 19 
1 A 37430 
2 Q 374309 
3 A Right 
4 Q And is that the same account number that 
5 appears in your deposition, paragraph No 2, sir9 
6 A It is 
7 Q Is this the business license that is referenced 
8 in Deposition Exhibit No 29 
9 A It is 
10 Q Thank you very much, sir When does that 
11 license expire, by the way, according to its own terms9 
12 A 31 December, 1998 
13 Q 31 December of '989 
14 A Right 
15 Q Of'98 Good for six months9 
16 A All our licenses expire the 31 st of December 
17 every year 
18 Q Every year, thank you 
19 A Right 
20 Q Is there any reason why that business license 
21 would not have been renewed had this continued to be m 
22 Salt Lake County9 
'23 MR FERGUSON Objection, speculation, insufficient 
24 foundation 
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I 1 BY MR PARSONS 
2 Q Any reason you know of at this point m time, 
3 sir9 
4 A No 
5 Q I appreciate the fact that you're relying on 
6 your counsel, that's important, that's good Lots of 
7 people don't 
8 MR FERGUSON Depends on who the lawyer is In 
9 this case, it's a good decision 
10 MR PARSONS off the record 
11 (Whereupon off-the-record discussion was held) 
12 (Exhibit No 6 was marked for identification) 
13 BY MR PARSONS 
14 Q Let me show you what has been marked as 
15 Deposition Exhibit 6, sir Do you recognize that 
16 document9 
17 A Yes, I do 
18 Q Did you write that document9 
19 A Yes, I did 
20 Q And are the contents of that document true and 
21 accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief7 
22 A They are 
23 Q Were you served with a subpoena duces tecum9 
24 A Yes, I was 
25 Q Do you have any documents that you have brought 
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1 with you9 
2 A Just the map that you requested 
3 Q May I see it9 Is this the Salt Lake County 
4 zoning map that was in effect at the time that the 
5 Statewide business application was made9 
6 A It is 
7 MR HALL Do you want to mark this9 
8 MR PARSONS Yes We'll mark this as Deposition 
9 Exhibit No 7 
10 (Exhibit No 7 was marked for identification) 
11 BY MR PARSONS 
12 Q Tell me, sir, is the property addressed 3350 
13 South 900 West, Salt Lake County, effective as of July 
14 of 1998, located within the confines of this zoning map9 
15 A Yes, they are 
16 Q Would you identify for me what that zoning map 
17 shows that zone to be9 
18 A Right here, Al zone 
19 Q All right I have a red marker here Would 
20 you mind putting a line around the zone that we have 
21 just identified9 Put your initials by that, please, 
22 sir And by that indication, you are telling us that 
23 the area that you have marked on this map is the area 
24 that was zoned Al that Mr Webber acquired a business 
I Page 22 
1 A That's correct 
2 Q Thank you, sir Do you have any knowledge of 
3 — knowledge personally of representations that were 
4 made by South Salt Lake concerning the persons who 
5 operated businesses m the annexed zone at the time of 
6 the annexation of this particular property? 
7 A No 
8 MR HALL objection to the characterization of a 
9 person of the City of South Salt Lake Be more 
10 specific, Brad 
11 MR PARSONS He has no knowledge, so we won't go 
12 any further because he has no knowledge 
13 MR HALL I didn' t hear that because I 
14 interrupted 
15 BY MR PARSONS 
16 Q I appreciate the fact that there wasn't much 
17 foundation for that question Relative to the zoning of 
18 this particular property, did that zone change while the 
19 property was still part of Salt Lake County between July 
20 of 1998 and the time that it was annexed, which I will 
21 represent to you was September 30 of '98? 
22 A No 
23 Q Okay Oh, let's review this map just for a 
24 second here again Is this road immediately north of 
25 this Al zone that you have here, is that 3300 South'? 
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1 A That's 3300 South. 
2 Q All right Is this -
3 A I'm not particularly sure whether it's north or 
4 south of it 
5 Q This is 3300 South? 
J 6 A This is 3300 South. 
7 Q Well, I think this is north 
8 A Right. 
9 Q So this would be south of 3300? 
10 A So right m there 
II Q Right m there somewhere7 
12 A Right. 
13 Q And are you familiar with the property itself 
14 personally? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Okay 
17 A I'm not. 
18 Q Are you familiar with the construction of a new 
19 jail complex and sheriffs administration complex by 
20 Salt Lake County? 
21 A No. 
22 Q The zoning department didn't have anything to 
23 do with the issues there? 
24 A Not --1 couldn't answer that because I really 
25 don't know 
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1 MR PARSONS That's fine. That's all I have. 
2 Thank you very much. I appreciate your time. 
3 EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR HALL 
5 Q Mr. Lawson, my name is Craig Hall I 'm a South 
6 Salt Lake City Attorney. I'd like to ask you some 
7 questions Let's go back to the business license 
8 process itself. If a person wants to apply for a home 
9 occupation, walk me through specifically step by step 
10 what that individual would need to do. 
11 A Basically what they would do is tell us what 
12 they're going to do. 
13 Q How would they tell you, orally or by written 
14 application? 
15 A Orally, if when you come m you say, I want to 
16 apply for a business, we ask them, Where is it located? 
17 Is it m your home? Is it commercial? If they say it's 
18 in their home, we immediately go to the map and make 
19 sure it is m the county We ask them, What are they 
20 planing on doing? If they're having customers, making 
21 anything, anything like that m the home, it have to go 
22 through a conditional-use process. If they say they 
23 just gonna ~ there's no customers or anything like that 
24 coming to the home, then we go ahead and let them fill 
25 out the appropriate paperwork, again, filling out the 
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1 business license application, application for a phone 
2 and mail, which stipulate six criteria they have to 
3 make If they can meet those criteria, then the staff 
4 can approve it there at the counter 
5 Q Let me ask you a question If, according to 
6 the County Zoning Ordinance, which was in fact allegedly 
7 on July 23, '98, Exhibit No 4, is a home occupation a 
8 conditional use? 
9 A If they gonna start having customers and stuff 
10 like that come out, it's home occupation and is 
11 conditional use But in this particular case, because 
12 there's no customers coming to the home, no employees 
13 coming to the home, no stock or trade kept on the 
14 property, the staff can sign that at the counter, we can 
15 approve that 
16 Q Is there a county ordinance that gives you that 
17 authority or right? 
18 A That's the - I won't say a county ordinance 
19 perse It's a division policy 
20 Q It's a division policy? 
21 A Right 
22 Q Despite the fact home occupation is listed as a 
23 conditional use in the Al zone? 
24 A Right 
25 Q So by policy-
Condenselt1 
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1 A -- we can approve that And that is why we 
2 developed this particular form, if they gonna do 
3 anything in their home other than just a phone, mail, 
4 fax machine, that type, then they do have to go through 
5 a conditional use process, which would be filling out 
6 this application here, going to the community counsel, 
7 notifying all the neighbors within 300 feet of the 
8 particular business, and going to a planning commission 
9 and a planning commission make the final recommendation 
10 Q Okay When a person walks m and fills out 
11 the — this form — and can we have this marked*? And I 
12 don't know what number we're on, 7 or 8 
13 (Exhibit No 8 was marked for identification ) 
14 BY MR HALL 
15 Q When they fill out the form marked as 
16 Deposition Exhibit No 8, does your department go out 
17 and make an inspection of the premises where the license 
18 is sought? 
19 A No, not necessarily 
20 Q Let's be particular--
21 A No 
22 Q -- in this case, regarding Statewide Bail 
23 Bonds? 
24 A Right 
25 Q Did you or any member of your staff to your 
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1 knowledge go visit the proposed location for Statewide 
2 Bail Bonds? 
3 A No 
4 Q So you rely entirely upon the representations 
5 of the applicant m the issuance of this license? 
6 A Right But, see, we also rely on our maps 
7 This is located m the home and it is an A1 zone and his 
8 representation on here is saying that it's going to be a 
9 phone and mail only If we go out and find out 
10 otherwise, that's grounds for revocation and I do set up 
11 a revocation to revoke the license based upon the zoning 
12 violation 
13 Q Is it illegal or not permissible under the home 
14 occupation ordinance which would be applicable to 
15 Statewide to have any signs or advertising on the 
16 premises? 
17 A Again, this here is what he signed to say 
18 there's no signs, no advertising authorized unless he 
19 comes back m and asked for a sign permit 
20 Q Would that include signs on vehicles? 
21 A We have no jurisdiction over signs on vehicles, 
22 but on this here, it said only private vehicles is 
23 allowed at the home 
24 Q What about signs on a mailbox? 
95 A Our nrrhrmnee T Hrm't k n o w exar t lv where ~ it 1 
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1 does allow a small, like, a name plate sign on the door 
2 for, say, delivery like for UPS 
3 Q What about mailboxes in your opinion? 
4 A In my opinion, I couldn't answer to that 
5 because I'm not over sign ordinance 
6 Q As a person authorized by the County to issue 
7 these type of licenses, if a complainant came in and 
8 said, John Doe, who's operating this home occupation, 
9 has a great big sign on his mailbox advertising ABC 
10 Company, would you approve it? Would you set up a 
11 revocation hearing? What would you do? 
12 A If he's got a sign, a big sign in his yard or 
13 on his house saying that he's doing a business, it's not 
14 authorized according to this, so what I would do, I 
15 would send one of my land use inspectors out there to 
16 leave him a note as to become compliant within X number 
17 of days 
18 Q What about advertisement on billboards that 
19 says ABC Company at 1234 Elm Street, it's an off-premise 
20 sign that refers to a home that has a home occupation? 
21 A As long as he have no customers coming to his 
22 home 
23 Q Now, you're familiar with the area at Ninth 
24 West and about 3500 South where Mr Webber's home is 
25 located, and to where the business license was 
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1 apparently issued It's immediately across the street 
2 from the jail, the new jail facility 
3 A Uh-huh 
4 Q Did you have any concern when you issued this 
5 license that he could not practically comply with the 
6 requirement of no customers? 
7 A Do I? Did we have? No, we didn't 
8 Q So you were totally satisfied with the 
9 representations that Mr Webber -- that he would never 
10 have any customers walk across the street to his 
11 business? 
12 A Correct 
13 Q He applied for the license on June — or excuse 
14 me, on July 23, 1998 When did the County Commission 
15 approve that license? 
16 A I'd probably speculate again, it probably went 
17 to the Commission within a week 
18 Q Did you bnng any information or documents 
19 today that would indicate when the County Commission 
20 approved or denied or reviewed this? 
21 A No, I didn't 
22 Q Do you have any direct knowledge that they did 
23 m fact consider this and approve it? 
24 A Yes 
?5 O What is that knowledge based on and tell me 
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1 about it. 
2 A. Knowledge based upon commissioners meet twice a 
3 week, Monday and Wednesday. At that particular time, 
4 every Monday and Wednesday, I have my clerks go in and 
5 fix out a list for business licenses to be processed and 
6 approved by the commissioner for that given week. We do 
7 this on a, I guess daily -- weekly basis, so it 
8 wouldn't ~ his name would have probably came out within 
9 probably -- the 23rd, depending on what day that was, 
10 but his name would have came out the following 
11 Commission meeting. 
12 Q. Is that -- excuse me, is that based on your 
13 normal operating procedure or direct knowledge that it 
14 did in fact occur? 
15 A. That's based upon our normal operating 
16 procedures. 
17 Q. So you have no direct knowledge that the Salt 
18 Lake County Commission approved or denied this license? 
19 A. No. But if I could go back and research the 
20 record, then it would come out and say whatever the 23rd 
21 was on, if it was on a Thursday, then it went to the 
22 Commission that following Monday. If it was a Tuesday, 
23 it went to Commission on that Wednesday of the following 
24 week. 
25 Q. Do you know when South Salt Lake effectively 
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1 annexed the property between 3300 South and 3900 South? 
2 A. Our record indicates September 4, 1998. 
! 3 Q. September 4? 
4 A. Right. 
5 Q. Do you know when that annexation was effective? 
6 A. That's the date that they told us it was 
7 effective, September 4, 1998. 
8 Q. Referring to Deposition Exhibit No. 5, which 
9 represents to be the business license, there's a date on 
10 there that says issue date. 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. And what is that date? 
13 A. That's dated November 4, 1998. 
14 Q. Is that after the effective date of the 
15 annexation? 
16 A. Right. You want me to explain that date? 
17 Q. No. 
18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. I've asked the question I wanted answered. Let 
20 me ask you a very considerate question, a question that 
21 I don't want you to take offense by, but I need to 
22 know. Did a member of the County Commission come to 
23 you, or to your knowledge, any member of your staff and 
24 say that -- and direct you or suggest that a business 
25 license for Statewide Bail Bonds be issued? 
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1 A. Repeat that again. 
2 Q. Did any member of the County Commission, during 
3 the application period around July 23, 1998, or soon 
4 thereafter, approach you or your staff suggesting or 
5 requesting that the license for Statewide Bail Bonds be 
6 issued? 
7 A. Not to my knowledge. 
8 Q. Okay. Let me be more direct. Did Commissioner 
9 Brent Overson come to you and suggest that that 
10 preferential treatment should be given Statewide Bail 
11 Bonds — be given to Statewide Bail Bonds in their 
12 application for a business license? 
13 A. Not to me, no. 
14 Q. To your knowledge, to any member of your staff? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Did somebody come to you in November and 
17 request that this business license be issued in 
18 November? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Why was it processed and issued in November? 
21 A. Again, as I said earlier, we started a new 
22 Hansen system. 
23 Q. What is a Hansen system? 
24 A. Okay. It's our software that we issue business 
25 licenses in. We were on a Paradox system, so we decided 
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1 to change systems. We came on-line with a new update 
2 system out of Sacramento, California. When we came 
3 on-line with that system from April to about October, we 
4 could not ~ we did not print any hard copy business 
5 license. We were having such a problem with it when we 
6 had Sacramento come back in, worked on the process about 
7 end of October or first part of November, we had a mass 
8 printing, like we printed out something like about 8-
9 900 business license hard copies. Once they kicked out 
10 of the computer system, then we automatically mail 
11 these. This in particular was annexed into South Salt 
12 Lake along with a bunch more, but they were already 
13 flagged to be printed. So when they came out printed, 
14 they had an issue date of 11/4/98. We did mail these 
15 particular licenses to the applicant because they was 
16 current at that particular time. 
17 Q. Okay. Mr. Lawson, Linda Kingsley works for 
18 you? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. Help me out on her scope of responsibility. I 
21 thought I heard you say that she was a cashier? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Her business license card says she's a business 
24 license specialist. 
25 A. That's correct. 
PSCTP 1(\ - Paap H 
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1 A It was drafted by the county attorney I'm 
2 assuming. 
3 Q Do you want to confer with your client? 
4 MS BECKSTEAD Please. 
5 THE WITNESS Okay. It was drafted by his 
6 attorney. 
7 BY MR HALL 
8 Q Did you modify, when you received it, did you 
9 modify any of the language or just review it and sign 
10 it? 
11 A No, I had it reviewed. 
12 Q And reviewed by whom? 
13 A By Rena. 
14 Q Were any changes made from the original draft 
15 that was given to you9 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Were any changes made m paragraph 4 from the 
18 original draft? 
19 A I can't remember on that. 
20 Q Do you know - do you remember any of the 
21 changes that were made from the original draft to the 
22 document that is now known as Exhibit No. 1 ? 
23 A There was some changes made, but I just can't 
24 remember what they was. 
25 MR HALL okay. Thank you. I don't have any other 
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later date. 
MS BECKSTEAD That's fine. 
(Whereupon deposition was concluded.) 
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1 questions Thank you, Mr Lawson 
2 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR PARSONS 
4 Q Just a second, Mr Lawson I'm going to have 
5 to look just quickly here and see if anything has 
6 arisen Mr Lawson, were there any complaints by 
7 neighbors that would have facilitated an on-site 
8 inspection by your staff? 
9 A No 
10 Q Relative to the questions concerning Mr 
11 Overson, have you heard that Mr Overson thought that 
12 bail bonds offices ought to be opposite the jail? 
13 A I haven't heard anything 
14 MR PARSONS Thank you That's all, sir Ms 
15 Betkstead, could I get your telephone number? 
16 MS BECKSTEAD 468-2650 
17 MR PARSONS 2650? 
18 MS BECKSTEAD Lh-huh 
19 MR FERGUSON Here's what I'll do, let's put it on 
20 the record we've stipulated that for purposes of our 
21 summary judgment motion on Monday, assuming it goes 
22 forward, that we can use the deposition transcripts 
23 without signature As a courtesy to you folks, we'll 
24 send you a copy anyway so you'll have a chance to review 
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STATE OF UTAH 
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) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
RUSSELL L LAWSON deposes and says 
That he is the witness referred to in the 
foregoing deposition that he has read the same 
and knows the contents thereof, that the same are true 
of his own knowledge 
RUSSELL L LAWSON 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
, 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in .Utah 
My Commission Expires 
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1 Reporter's Certificate 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 I, KELLY SOMMERVILLE, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
6 do hereby certify: 
7 That the deposition of RUSSELL L. LAWSON was 
taken before me pursuant to Notice at the time and place 
8 therein set forth, at which time the witness was by me 
duly sworn to testify the truth; 
9 
That the testimony of the witness and all objections 
10 made and all proceedings had at the time of the 
examination were recorded stenographically by me and 
11 were thereafter transcribed, and I hereby certify that 
the foregoing deposition transcript is a full, true, and 
12 correct record of my stenographic notes so taken; 
13 I further certify that I am neither counsel for 
nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise 
14 interested in the outcome thereof. 
15 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 16th day of 
September, 2000. 
17 
18 
KELLY SOMMERVILLE, RPR 
19 Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
20 
21 
Mv Commission Expires: 
22 June 10,2002 
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ADDENDUM 7 
Transcript of the Court's Oral Decision, September 18,2000 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE 
BAIL BONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 000901508 
Case No. 20001021-SC 
ORAL ARGUMENTS ON 
COUNTER MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Videotape Proceedings') 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of 
September, 2000, commencing at the hour of 10:06 a.m., 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendant: 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS, III 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorney at Law 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, #500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-
H. CRAIG HALL 
South Salt Lake 
220 East Morris 
Salt Lake City, 
Citv 
5678 j 
Attorney 1 
Avenue 
Utah 84115 
mn 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA ORiVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Statewide Bail Bonds vs. City of 
South Salt Lake. Case No. 000901508. 
Counsel, would you enter your appearances, 
please? 
MR. PARSONS: William Parsons on behalf of 
Statewide Bail Bonds, your Honor. 
MR. FERGUSON: Dennis Ferguson and Craig Hall on 
behalf of the City of South Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: All right. We're here on motions for 
summary judgment. Counsel? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. Are you ready to proceed? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, a question of the 
Court to begin with, but there are some procedural motions 
in terms of a motion to continue. And I didn't know if 
your Honor wanted to hear the argument on the merits of the 
motion for summary judgment, or—because Mr. Hall's going 
to handle that, I'm off the hook. 
THE COURT: I'll hear the arguments on the motion 
to strike and motion to continue first, I probably ought to 
deal with that initially. 
MR. FERGUSON: All right. 
2 
1 MR. PARSONS: Your Honor, it's my motion to 
2 strike and there's the second, my motion to continue 
3 (inaudible). 
4 We have supplemented memorandum in support of our 
5 objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment 
6 indicating that we felt that there were a number of 
7 procedural errors in that process, your Honor. 
8 I trust that the Court is in possession of the 
9 same and has the opportunity of reviewing it. I, frankly, 
10 have not a great deal to add to that which we have written 
11 down, the nature of the procedural errors that we find most 
12 telling are the fact that the statement of facts that the 
13 city has submitted in support of its motion for summary 
14 judgment are not specifically supported by either affidavit 
15 or references to the record; in other words, there are no 
16 facts, there are only allegations that support the city's 
17 motion for summary judgment. 
18 As taken under the—the definitions of a Rule 56 
19 and a Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Code of Judicial 
20 Administration, there is not a con—there is no concise 
21 statement that sets forth the factual allegations, again 
22 referring to the record and for that reason, we believe 
2 3 that their motion for summary judgment should be stricken. 
24 The reason that I have asked for continuation of 
25 this process is because we were in the process of engaging 
3 
1 in discovery. We set depositions in this matter, actually 
2 conducting two of them this past Friday, one involving the 
3 officer of Salt Lake County who issued the—whose office 
4 issued the business license to Ty Webber in 19—in July of 
5 1998 and one involving the city building inspector. 
6 There's at least one additional, if not two 
7 additional depositions that will be required in that case 
8 if ultimately, we are capable of at least finding the one 
9 deponee, (sic) who is a prior employee of South Salt Lake 
10 and an inspector. And we require the deposition of Brent 
11 Overson, Salt Lake County Commissioner. We have not been 
12 capable of scheduling that with Mr. Overson, so we have not 
13 noticed the same up. 
14 We have conducted preliminary—preliminary 
15 discovery and frankly, at this particular point in time, if 
16 the case—if the Court decides that it's appropriate for us 
17 to proceed, I don't think that'll be greatly prejudiced but 
18 I'd prefer to complete the discovery before the motions for 
19 summary judgment are argued. 
20 I might add that I've not been capable of picking 
21 up my copies of the depositions that were conducted on 
22 Friday as of this point in time. I think my client did 
2 3 yesterday, on Sunday, but I'm not sure about that and s o — 
24 he's not here yet and I can't tell you. 
25 That's all that I have relevant to the same. 
4 
1 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 I MR. PARSONS: I'll reserve, of course, my 
3 arguments. 
4 Your Honor, I would procedurally suggest that if 
5 it's appropriate for us to argue both of our motions for 
6 summary judgment, that it might, time-wise, permit us some 
7 judicial economy if we simply argue our own affirmative 
8 motions because the affirmations that we make in our own 
9 motions are effectively the counter-positions that we have 
10 in the opposition's motion and our objections to their 
11 motions. 
12 Thank you, Judge. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
14 Mr. Ferguson? 
15 MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, the—with regard to 
16 the motion for a continuance, I—I guess I have two 
17 problems. Normally, if—if a party believes that there are 
18 issues of fact that—that they can't respond to a motion 
19 for summary judgment until they discover, we proceed with 
20 Rule 56(f) affidavits that lay out the discovery that's 
21 desired and what the party thinks that discovery will 
22 disclose. 
23 The plaintiff has not done that in this case. I-
24 -I don't want to come in here and stand on procedure, but— 
25 but this—the—the only issue before this Court is a 
5 
1 petition to ask this Court to judicially overturn a 
2 legislative zoning decision of the City of South Salt Lake, 
3 That's the issue before this Court. 
4 And it's our position and always has been that 
5 with regard to that claim, that's—that's a claim on the 
6 record, on the legislative record, which is—which is 
7 clearly attached to and made a part of our memorandum. 
8 Plaintiff, for some reason in this case, decided 
9 to proceed on two tracks simultaneously. One was to seek a 
10 petition for review from this Court, the other was to file 
11 a motion for—or a—a damage case that's pending before 
12 Judge Lewis. Made the decision to—to—to go forward on 
13 two different tracks on a—on a case arising out of the 
14 same essentially fact situation. 
15 And what the plaintiff is claiming and their 
16 motion for summary judgment in this case is really not 
17 relevant to the petition because what they're saying is, 
18 gee, we had a business license when we were—we were given 
19 a business license by Salt Lake County and so even though 
20 City of South Salt Lake has now annexed us, we're entitled 
21 to be grandfathered in and we're entitled to a zoning 
22 change based upon the business license that was granted us 
2 3 by—by Salt Lake County. 
24 And that—that issue or that argument may be, may 
25 be relevant in the damage case pending before Judge Lewis, 
6 
1 I but it is not relevant to the Court's determination of the 
2 I legislative decision made by the—by the City of South Salt 
3 I Lake in no rezoning the plaintiff's property. And that's 
4 really the sole issue before, that we believe is before 
5 this Court. 
6 And if we focus on that issue, all of the other 
7 procedural stuff in terms of wanting more discovery and— 
8 and the argument over whether that—that's Mr. Parsons' own 
9 fault for not proceeding more quickly and—and all of that 
10 stuff is—is really not important. 
11 We think what—what ought to occur here today is 
12 to hear argument on our motion for summary judgment that 
13 relate solely to the petition, to have this Court review 
14 that legislative decision and argument on the motion for 
15 summary judgment which does raise issue—issues of fact 
16 that's been filed by the plaintiff. It is not—is not a — 
17 this is not the appropriate forum for that. Unless there's 
IS a consolidation down the road of these cases, that's 
19 something that Judge Lewis would decide. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
21 J Anything further? 
MR. PARSONS: No. I'm prepared to go forward and 
23 I argue my motion (inaudible) 
24 THE COURT: All right. Well, what I'm going to 
25 do, I'm going to deny the motion to continue and deny the 
7 
1 motion to strike. Arguments of counsel for the defendant 
2 were persuasive to the Court. I believe that what is 
3 before me is not the sort of—of motion that would be 
4 vulnerable to a motion to strike and I think on—in terms 
5 of a continuance—on the motion to continuance—continue 
6 the matter, again, what the Court believes it has before it 
7 is what has—has been raised as—as the legislative 
8 question and therefore, I think that this is a time—an 
9 appropriate time to proceed on that. 
10 I'll hear your argument on the merits now. 
11 MR. PARSONS: Thanks, Judge. Ready to go 
12 forward. 
13 MR. HALL: Your Honor, I believe this is the 
14 City's motion for summary judgment. 
15 MR. PARSONS: Well, we both have motions for 
16 summary judgment pending. 
17 THE COURT: I'll let—well, you go ahead and 
18 argue yours first. 
19 MR. HALL: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: That's fine. 
21 MR. PARSONS: I don't know if this is the easiest 
22 one to work with, Judge, but I need (inaudible) as to the 
23 (inaudible) By the way, I'll (inaudible) 
24 Judge, the area that we are dealing with here is-
25 -was in the confines of the City of South Salt Lake. The 
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1 City of South Salt Lake has in its southwestern corner an 
2 area that is boundered—boundaried by the Jordan River on 
3 the western side and then an arbitrary boundary across the 
4 southern border. 
5 The street that is designated 900 West runs 
6 through this and that's 900 West that my pen is pointing at 
7 right there. And immediately below this Red B, this is A 
8 zone is the area that we're dealing with and it is zoned A-
9 1, agricultural one, and this is this dark green zone up 
10 here. 
11 I have in my memorandum a—an exhibit, your 
12 Honor, and I'd appreciate it if you'd refer to that, it's 
13 Exhibit J, and Exhibit J is a color map that—this is 
14 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
±5 I Judgment, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: I'm—I'm looking for it. 
17 MR. PARSONS: Uh huh. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. PARSONS: I was working from my own copy. 
20 Appreciate that. 
21 The area that is impacted by the motion for 
2 2 summary judgment, your Honor, is boundaried by 3 3rd South 
2 3 on the bottom of your page and that page runs in a 
24 southerly direction towards the top of the page and the 
25 southern boundary of the City of South Salt Lake is 
1 approximately 3655 South. 
2 900 West is shown in the center of that page and 
3 the properties that we are asking to have the Court 
4 consider the issue of zoning relative to is Statewide Bail 
5 Bonds' property that is on the right-hand portion and it's 
6 in a tan color, if the Court can see that, 
7 THE COURT: I see it. 
8 MR. PARSONS: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 It's important for you to understand factually 
10 the nature of the configuration of the property because 
11 that's a central portion of the argument that we are 
12 making. 
13 Along 33rd South, your Honor, coming from the 
14 east, we find a golf course to the north of 33rd South, a 
15 convenience store on the corner, then a giant parking lot 
16 with a Sam's Club, a very large retail organization, 
17 wholesale-retail organization on the northwest corner of 
18 the intersection of 33rd South. 
19 On the south side of 33rd South, the block across 
20 the street from Statewide Bail Bonds, we find Salt Lake 
21 Valley GMC, as we approach from the east, a very large 
22 parking lot and then the Salt lake County Sheriff's Office 
23 in a very large building directly across the street. And 
24 then immediately south of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
25 Office is the Salt Lake County Jail and another exceedingly 
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large building and—and south of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office is another very large parking lot and UTA 
facility on both sides of 900 West, both sides of 900 West. 
And then when you come from the north to the 
south on the west side of that street, you'll find 
properties that are numbered three, two and one and then 
Statewide. Three, two and one are all residences, 
Statewide has two properties there and they're both 
residences. Of those five properties in line, three, two, 
one and then the two for Statewide, four of those five are 
owned by bail bonding companies. The property on the 
corner, Number Three is not, and I have furnished an 
affidavit of Mr. Frederickson, but I will represent that he 
has stood in—in meetings before South Salt Lake in 
reference to the fact that he is not opposed to the 
rezoning of the property. 
Immediately south of Statewide is the brand new 
call center for Salt Lake County, that's where the 9-1-1 
calls are—go in come—go in and come out from. And then 
the—below that's, the jail command center, Salt Lake 
Valley Youth Detention Center below that, and again, the 
very large complex for UTA. 
Behind that, you have farm ground. When I say 
behind it, I mean to the west of our property, to the west 
of—of—of the 1000 West. You'll see that UTA, Salt Lake 
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1 I Valley Youth Detention Center and the 9-1-1 Center extend 
2 | all the way in to 1000 West, but there are some farms along 
3 f 1000 West, on the east side of that street. 
4 There is a—there is another property that is 
5 owned by a bail bondsman that is Number four, along the 
6 south side of 3 3rd South and then Number five is a vacant 
7 field and Number six is the Silver Bullet Lounge, it's a 
8 beer joint, which has been there for a long, long time. 
9 That's the nature of the property that we are— 
10 that we are talking about, Judge. The nature of the 
11 argument that we are making is relatively simple. That 
12 argument is, is that at a given point in time, Salt Lake 
13 County anticipated that it was appropriate to construct a 
14 whole series of municipal facilities, the jail complex, the 
15 9-1-1 center, the sheriff's office, the Youth Detention 
16 Center and a whole bunch of other things down there, 
17 exactly across the street from Mr. Webber's property. 
18 Mr. Webber, in anticipation of a new jail going 
19 in there and jail center and so forth, purchased that 
20 property, as did a number of other bail bondsmen, purchased 
21 property across the street from the jail, basically, as did 
22 I a number of other bail bondsmen. 
23 I At the point in time that Mr. Webber bought his 
24 properly (sic) he began immediately the process of 
25 remodeling that property and then in July of 1998, in fact, 
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on the 23rd day of July of 1998, Mr. Webber filled out an 
appropriate application for a business license from Salt 
Lake County. That application was granted. 
On this past Friday, we took the—the deposition 
of the gentleman who runs the—the Department, Mr. Russell 
Lawson, who gave that business license out. And Mr. Lawson 
verified, I will represent to you, although I do not have 
the record available to me because the depo was just taken 
Friday, and the reason it was just taken Friday is because 
we couldn't work any other time out before the arguments. 
Anyway, Mr. Larson (sic), I will represent to 
you, indicated, just as his affidavit which is appended to 
our motion for summary judgment so indicates, that the 
business license application was in order by Ty Webber and 
that the business license was granted effective July 23rd 
of 1998. 
In September of 1998, South Salt Lake City, or 
the City of South Salt Lake, annexed the property that Mr. 
Webber occupied. It also annexed all of the property that 
contained the call center, the Youth Detention Center, the 
UTA facility and the jail complex and Sam's Club and the 
golf course and GMC and so forth. It annexed that whole 
zone right down to 3600 South—or actually below that. 
I—I misspoke when I said 3 6 was the southern 
boundary. It is not, it's just the southern boundary of 
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that A-l zone, but it annexed property there. I don't know 
exactly where the annexation covered, but all of that was 
zoned A-l at the time of the annexation. 
Salt Lake County's A-l zoning, it is represented 
by the documents submitted by the City of South Salt Lake, 
is the same zoning, contains the same language, is the same 
zoning ordinance as South Salt Lake's zoning ordinance 
relative to A-l. We have appended in our motion for 
summary judgment a copy of Salt Lake County's ordinance for 
A-l zoning. 
We were, at the time that we acquired our 
business license on July 23rd of 1998, doing business as a 
home owner occupied business in the A-l zone, which South 
Salt Lake has objected to and which Salt Lake County 
indicated in—again, in Russell Lawson's deposition this 
past Friday, was entirely appropriate; in other words, that 
there was nothing wrong, as long as we meet all of the 
criteria with doing business as a home occupied business. 
There was no prohibition for bail bondsmen having a bail 
bonding office in their home, living there, running their 
bail bonding office, as long as they did it within certain 
configurations an that is precisely what Mr. Ty Webber did. 
He remodeled it, moved in, opened his business up 
and did business there for a number of weeks, if not a 
couple of months, let's see, August, September, eight, 
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nine, approximately nine or ten weeks prior to the 
annexation by South Salt Lake. 
Now, the—the home occupation use that is 
permitted by Salt Lake County was—was again verified by 
the affidavit which is, I believe, Exhibit 4—no, C, pardon 
me, to our memoranda, and—and Mr. Lawson indicated that 
even though South Salt Lake may have treated an application 
of that variety as a non-conforming use requiring a 
hearing, Salt Lake County did not. All that was required 
was that Mr. Webber fill out the application, sign the 
affidavit, pay the fee and he was capable of doing 
business. 
Now, it just so happened that Salt Lake County at 
that particular point in time had changed computer systems 
a few months earlier and they were incapable of actually 
issuing the business license on that date. They issued the 
business license on November 4th of 1996, in a mass 
printing, according to Mr. Lawson. He indicated that there 
were a number of hundreds of those business licenses that 
were printed on that day. 
He further indicated in his deposition that there 
was nothing unusual about that, meaning that South Salt— 
that Statewide Bail Bonding was not treated out of the 
ordinary, that they were handled in the same methodology, 
by the same—in the same manner that any other business 
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would have been handled, who had made such an application 
on that day and in fact, that is precisely what happened. 
We—we learned in the course of the deposition 
that the guidelines under A-l zoning do not speak 
specifically of bail bonding organizations as being 
permitted as home occupied—home occupation businesses, but 
South—but Salt Lake County treats that as being 
appropriate unless it is specifically denied. Unless there 
is a prohibitation in the license—check that, that in the 
statute that would prohibit you from engaging in some kind 
of business, they allow you the opportunity of going forth 
and doing business. 
I will point out to you that the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah has, on a number of occasions, reviewed 
that issue and in Patterson vs. Utah County Board of 
Adjustments
 f a 1995 case, I said Supreme Court, it's the 
Court of Appeals. The concept associated with whether or 
not you should be permitted the opportunity of going 
forward and—and doing business in the zone unless there 
was a specific prohibitation to the contrary was affirmed, 
specifically. That case was affirmed subsequently by the 
Utah Supreme Court in a 1999 decision entitled Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community in the City of Springville 
vs. the City of Springville. Both of those cases are cited 
and references provided in our memoranda. 
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The—the nature of the—the nature of the 
arguments that we make based upon those factual allegations 
are as follows, your Honor: Basically, that—and—and the 
arguments are twofold. Basically that Mr. Webber's 
business, the Statewide Bail Bonding business was a legally 
authorized business doing business in an appropriate zone 
at the point in time that South Salt Lake annexed his 
property. And as such, they're grandfather, and nothing 
more complex than that, by the way of the first 
consideration, the first argument, the first point. 
I presume that the Court would not require me, we 
do cite in our memoranda the cases that support the 
proposition that grandfathering is appropriate when a 
business is doing business legally and the zoning is 
changed, he's entitled to continue to do business until 
such time as he effectively stops doing that business. 
That's a relatively traditional law. The English 
common law is, is of course that you're entitled to do 
business on your property regardless of what you're doing 
until there's a specific—specific prohibitation by law and 
that specific prohibitation would have to be justified in 
the public interest. 
That has been—that English common law has been 
substantiated again in both the Springville and the 
Patterson cases that I have referred to previously. That 
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is the law of the State of Utah at this particular point in 
time. 
And that gives rise to the second point of 
interest or—or—or point that I wish you to consider and 
that is, is that in addition to being grandfathered, 
there's no exclusion. He's appropriately in the right 
zone. He's not excluded from the language—by the language 
of the statute and I might point out that South Salt Lake 
has not amended this A-1 zoning or had not at that point in 
time. I believe they may subsequently have done so, but 
they had not amended their A-1 zoning ordinance and—at the 
point in time of the annexation, and at the point in time 
of the annexation, there was no prohibitation for home 
occupied business and in fact, they were specifically 
granted and bail bonding companies were not specifically 
prohibited as a home occupied business in the A-1 zoning 
under South Salt Lake's zoning ordinances. 
So, for the reason that we have a proper business 
license at the time of the annexation, that we therefore 
ought to be grandfathered and that we qualify under the A-1 
zoning anyway, we suggest to you that it is appropriate to 
force the City to permit us the opportunity of either 
continuing to do business as a non-conforming use and grant 
us a business license accordingly. Or, in the alternative, 
we have suggested that the actions of the City of South 
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Salt Lake constitute a reverse spot zone. 
Now, the reason that we suggest that they 
constitute a reverse spot zone is best understood when you 
look at that little diagram that you have before you, your 
Honor. That diagram shows you quite clearly that what we 
have along 900 West, when we are below 3 3rd South and above 
3655 South, is a—a—an area that is approximately three-
and-a-half blocks long on two sides of the street, 
containing—and I don't know whether you would consider it-
-I don't—you don't call the Salt Lake County Jail 
commercial. UTA may or may not be commercial, I frankly 
don't know that, but it—we all know what UTA does, they 
operate buses and they don't raise cows and pigs and 
horses, nor does the Salt Lake County Jail, nor does the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office or GMC—Valley—Salt Lake 
Valley GMC, nor does the 9-1-1 call center, the jail 
command center, the Salt Lake Youth Detention Center. 
And I might add, neither do Statewide Bail Bonds, 
Hy & Mike's Bail Bonds or Beehive Bail Bonds, the owners of 
properties listed as Statewide Bail Bonds, numbered one and 
two and four on your map, along 900 West and 3 3rd South. 
The gentleman there, who is Mr. Frederickson, on the 
corner, Mr. Frederickson, as I've indicated, I haven't an 
affidavit from him, he—he has not been willing to produce 
one, he has indicated at this particular point that—that— 
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he has indicated in public meetings that he has no 
objection as long as he was able the opportunity to 
continue to—to have animals until such time that his 
property was sold. He recognizes that the property is 
prime commercial property and ultimately, that's what it 
will be. 
Now, when you consider the physical 
characteristics and you look at the nature of that which 
surrounds Statewide Bail Bonding, then you can clearly see 
why we would suggest that there is in fact a reverse spot 
zoning. 
And the cases provide that, and we've cited you 
to the cases in the memoranda. Cases provide that—that 
spot zoning involves the concept of an isolated piece of 
ground being zoned differently from surrounding ground for 
the benefit of those persons in that isolated zone. 
Well, we only have Mr. Frederickson on the corner 
along 900 West as it goes all the way from 33rd to 3655 
that even remotely is agricultural in character and 
everything else is other a business or vacant ground, one 
vacant lot, a whole bunch of business people who want to be 
in business, who aren't now because they haven't been 
issued business licenses; but trust me, when I tell you 
that Hy & Mike's Bail Bonds and Beehive Bail Bonds have 
also appeared before the City of South Salt Lake and 
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petitioned for a consideration of rezoning as well. 
Now, it would make a tremendous amount of sense 
for one to say, my goodness gracious, 900 West looks a 
whole lot like it's an area that isn't going to in the 
future, raise cows and pigs; but in the future, is in fact 
going to operate as either quasi-public or commercial 
ground. And that's precisely what is occurring today 
without the benefit of the rezoning. 
Now, I admit, sir, that the zone that is A-l runs 
from 900 West all the way over to the river along our side 
of the road, all the way across the other side is—is—I 
was about to say is light industrial. It's not, your 
Honor. 
The—the map, if I understand it correctly, no, 
that's correct. Across the other side is light industrial, 
this gray zone and we're here, if I—if I am looking at the 
map correctly and Hy &—yes, I am. Right here. This is 
the Statewide property right at the end of my finger—I 
know you can't see that from here, but you can see the 
color differentiation and the A-l zone is the dark green 
and the light industrial is this and this is business. 
So, we are surrounded on three sides by either 
light industrial or business zone and all the way down 900 
West, which is this road that separates the two zones, all 
the way up and down 900 West on both sides is the property 
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that I have described. 
For us to consider that—that the modification of 
the Statewide Bail Bonding property and, for instance, Hy & 
Mike's and Beehive Bail Bond and so forth, to accommodate 
their business operations from A-l to whatever South Salt 
Lake wants it to be in order to permit us the opportunity 
of operating a bail bonding there would be selective zoning 
for the benefit of the owners, is precisely the opposite. 
The selective zoning has occurred by South Salt Lake in—in 
prohibiting us from having the opera—the opportunity to 
operate our businesses there when you have clearly either 
commercial, industrial or quasi-public operations that 
totally surround us and encompass all of the property that 
we're seeking to have rezoned. 
So, we have suggested that the decision of the 
City Commission is arbitrary and capricious and that the 
arbitrary and capricious decision is not substantiated by 
any evidence and that since it is arbitrary and capricious 
and not substantiated by any significant evidence, as is 
required, I might add, by the specific language of the 
Sprinaville Citizens case; since it is not substantiated or 
is not substantiated by any significant evidence, that we 
are entitled, as a matter of law, to have that rezoned 
because their actions are again, arbitrary and capricious. 
Now, in order to substantiate your entitlement to 
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do such a thing because the City will argue that your 
discretion is exceedingly limited, because the only thing 
you have the opportunity of doing is reviewing the facts of 
the things that have occurred, the processes that have 
occurred and making a determination as to whether or not 
those concepts were conducted appropriately, those actions 
were conducted approximately, I wish to point out to you 
that the Court of Appeals—check that, the Supreme Court in 
the Statewide case, used some remarkably interesting 
language. 
It said that a municipality's land use is 
arbitrary and capricious if it is not substantiated by—if 
it is not supported by substantial evidence. And then it 
went on to say that the standard of review in determining 
whether there was an arbitrary and capricious action that 
had been undertaken by a board of adjustments or a city 
council, in this case, both the board of adjustments in 
this case and the city council, by the way. 
Court said that they would review the evidence in 
the record to insure that the city proceeded within the 
limits of fairness and acted in good faith. 
Now, I—I challenge you to consider what the 
concept of fairness and acting in good faith would mean. 
When you look at Exhibit J and you see that which surrounds 
us on—on three sides, and we're not talking about the 
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1 property behind our lot line, to the west of us. And I 
2 recognize that—that there may be difficulty in drawing a 
3 boundary behind there because the properties don't all 
4 reach the same distance towards 1000 West or something of 
5 that character; but when you look at what surrounds us, 
6 when you look at the reality of the circumstance and you 
7 ask yourself—when you apply the standard of review that 
8 the Supreme Court has said you would apply and that is to 
9 examine the record to insure that the city proceeded within 
10 the limits of fairness and acted in good faith, you can see 
11 that is—that they didn't, they haven't. They haven't. 
12 We had a business license so we ought to have 
13 been grandfathered. That's not fair that they didn't 
14 grandfather us; in fact, it's illegal, it's an illegal act. 
15 They can't not do that. We're entitled to be 
16 grandfathered. 
17 We might not have been entitled, I admit, to the 
18 zone that—I mean to the license that we got, but we got 
19 it. I'm not suggesting that we weren't entitled to it, I'm 
20 just saying argumentatively, let's suggest that—that we 
21 didn't meet all the criteria. Well, once we got it, Mr. 
22 Lawson explained that the process is, is for somebody to 
23 complain and a review hearing to take place and then if you 
24 made an application to revoke, you'd have a hearing to 
25 revoke the license; but you don't not grandfather us. 
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If we have the license and you annex us, we're 
entitled to continue to do business and we did that, we had 
the licenses and we were grandfathered. Now, that's the 
first point. 
Second point again is that the A-l zone didn't 
change between Salt Lake County and South Salt Lake, the 
language didn't change. We qualified under Salt Lake 
County and we don't have any specific exclusions in South 
Salt Lake's language that says we don't qualify; therefore, 
we do. And that's what the case law says, as I pointed out 
to you in the memorandum. 
And in addition to that, as I've said, when you 
look at it, it's clearly a reverse spot zone. That is 
precisely what it is, they're treating us unfairly, they're 
treating us arbitrarily because they're not allowing us the 
opportunity of doing what UTA is doing, what Valley Mental 
Health is doing, what—what the GMC dealership is doing and 
effectively, the same thing that—that Salt Lake County is 
doing when they operate their business operation of the 
sheriff's office, the jail, the call center and the Youth 
Detention Center. 
And for you to think that—that, you know, I—I 
admit that those are all public things and I admit that 
those public things have exclusions in the language of 
statutes of—of the zoning ordinances, but still, the point 
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is, is—is that that's the nature of everything that's 
there. 
And when you look at that, they don't meet the 
standard of fairness and good faith and that is the 
standcird, that is precisely the standard. And that's the 
standard of review and that's what the case says that it is 
and that's still good law. That's precisely the standard 
that you need to be applying in this case. 
So, for all of the reasons that I have stated, we 
are properly before you with regards to the issue of, 
number one, either ordering the City grant us a grandfather 
provision or—and—and a new business license in conformity 
therewith, or in the alternative and really, it ought to be 
"and/or" because I think we're entitled to both, and/or 
grant us a zone change because they have not acted, and you 
are—you are reviewing both the question of our application 
for a business license, we—and you'll see in our factual 
allegations, we made an application for a business license, 
it was denied, we made an application for a zone change, it 
was denied. So, you're dealing with two sets of records 
here, not just one, it's not just the question of the zone 
change. 
And in both instances, I believe that—that we 
have not treated as the Supreme Court requires, as the 
Court of Appeals has suggested, the Supreme Court has 
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affirmed, with an eye towards fairness and good faith. 
Do you have any questions of me, sir? 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Parsons. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank you very much. I appreciate 
your patience. 
THE COURT: Okay. Before you stand, Mr. Hall, 
would the counsel for Lacido versus Airbrooke step forward 
please? 
(Whereupon, the Court handled an unrelated 
matter.) 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr, Hall? 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
For the sake of clarity, I'd like to clarify some 
misstatements of Mr. Parsons. It's probably because of his 
unfamiliarity with the events and the fact—and the 
situation surrounding South Salt Lake. 
On October 1st, 1998, the City of South Salt Lake 
annexed the property from the south—or the center line of 
33rd South all the way to 3900 South, from the Jordan River 
east to 700 East. This was not just some piecemeal 
annexation of a few acres of property. I think the Court 
might have got the impression that just the area identified 
in green on the map was annexed, but in fact, it was not. 
The City went from 3 300 South to 3 900 South, Jordan River 
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to 700 East, which was about a 40 percent increase in the 
size of the city. 
This is an application or a petition for review 
of a zoning decision made by the City Council of the City 
of South Salt Lake in January of 2000- Counsel's attempted 
to confuse the issue of the petition for review with the 
issue of the grandfathering the business license. 
Mr. Parsons has filed a separate and independent 
action for that. That is—as Mr. Ferguson has indicated, 
that is presently pending before Judge Lewis. 
In our motion for summary judgment, we address 
briefly the issue of the business license. If in fact it 
is properly before the Court today, we believe that it 
needs to be dismissed summarily because he, Mr. Parsons on 
behalf of his client, or other counsel, did not follow the 
Rules of Administrative Procedure and did not exist their— 
exhaust their administrative remedies as provided for by 
the business license ordinance of the City of South Salt 
Lake. 
They had plenty of opportunity to file an appeal 
before the hearing license board within 30 days after 
denial of their application. Such took place, the denial 
and it is in our memorandum, on July 2nd, 1999. No appeal 
from that denial was taken at all on behalf of Statewide 
Bail Bonds or Mr. Ty Webber. And— 
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THE COURT: Is—is that your response to his 
issue of grandfathering, that—was there an independent 
response? 
MR. HALL: My response to that is, no, that—that 
is not directly our response because we do not believe that 
it was grandfathered. We believe and are prepared in the 
other action to show that the license was not properly 
issued. 
Mr. Lawson, in his deposition on Friday, 
testified that, yes, it was a conditional use, a home 
occupation under the terms and conditions of the county 
zoning ordinance, it was a home occupation; but despite 
that fact that a home occupation requires the filing of a 
conditional use permit application and going through the 
planning and zoning process of Salt Lake County, Mr. Lawson 
issued that without any directive, policy or executive 
order from the county commission that they just issued the 
home occupation. 
We submit that that was an illegal act of a 
functionary in Salt Lake County and we're prepared to show 
that in the action pending before Judge Lewis. 
We do not believe that it is a proper item to 
bring up under 10-9—or excuse me, yeah, 10-9-1001 of the 
Municipal Planning Act. It says a petition for review may 
be filed of a zoning action of a city council or a city, or 
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1 this happens to be a board of adjustments, must be filed 
2 within the statutory period of 30 days. 
3 That's why he's here. He is appealing from a 
4 decision of the city council to deny a request for a 
5 rezoning of a single one lot parcel of ground. And if you 
6 listen to Mr.—Mr. Parsons today, he would want you to 
7 believe that this was a global application for rezoning the 
8 whole area. 
9 He's taken much time and effort to explain to you 
10 about the uses that exist on 900 West. The uses that he's 
11 talking about, Beehive, Hy & Mike's and those sort of 
12 things do not exist. They're only—all parcels of 
13 property, homes, residential units are owned by those 
14 businesses, they're not operating those businesses. 
15 And in fact, they have had their opportunity 
16 before the Planning & Zoning Commission and the city 
17 council for rezoning applications and those are also—were 
18 rejected by the city council. 
19 Now, this is an application for zoning one parcel 
20 of ground. And if you go back to the Eng Floral and the 
21 Crestview case in 1979, I believe, more than 20 years ago, 
22 it says spot zoning is illegal. If you take that map and 
2 3 carve out one piece, one lot, one residential lot on the 
24 west side of 900 West and zone it either commercial or 
25 light industrial, that is the classic case of spot zoning. 
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His argument that it is a reverse spot zoning and not to do 
it is fallacious. 
Your Honor is well familiar with, I think the— 
the code and the state statutes that provide that the 
courts shall presume that land use decisions and 
regulations of a municipality are valid. And your only 
scope of review is to determine whether or not the decision 
is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
There has been on representation in any 
memorandum, any affidavit, that this action by the city 
council and the City of South Salt Lake, following the 
recommendation, unanimous recommendation of the Planning & 
Zoning Commission and the unanimous recommendation of the 
community council that it be denied. 
The courts have—the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court have recently interpreted what arbitrary and 
capricious mean. And the recent case of Harmon City vs. 
the City of Draper talks about reasonably debatable. Now, 
Mr. Parsons and I all day long could debate whether or not 
the zoning change is appropriate. Reasonably debatable. 
Now, that the court has said if it's reasonably 
debatable and the city—then the following city council 
decision should be upheld and it's not arbitrary and 
capricious. 
I would call the Court's attention to the record, 
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the findings of fact and the minutes where both the 
Planning & Zoning Commission and the city council, they 
entered findings, they entered conclusions. Based on the 
testimony they received, the staff report and the 
recommendation they received and the comments of the 
applicant and the property owners in the area, all of those 
findings and conclusions were consistent. And the findings 
were these: 
Number one, the rezoning was contrary to the 
general plan. Mr. Webber did not even apply to amend the 
general plan. He just said, Please rezone my property. 
Finding number one is contrary to the general plan. 
Number two, we've talked about. The zoning would 
admit—would amount to spot zoning. 
Number three, the city has made a decision in the 
general plan that this area should remain agricultural. As 
you can see from the map very graphically, the city council 
in their policy and legislative decision-making capacity, 
have decided they want some agricultural uses in the City 
of South Salt Lake. 
As you can see, this property across the—the 
Jordan River, the city council in 1998 adopted a Jordan 
River master plan to preserve the area and the character 
and to develop those type of facilities for the benefit of 
the residents and the other citizens of the community. 
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This general plan in the denial of rezoning is consistent 
with that action. 
And number four, two-thirds of the city without 
the appli—without applying for a conditional use or any 
other type of application is available for the 
establishment of the business and running the business that 
Mr. Parsons' client would like to run. 
For example, he could go across the street. If 
he could acquire property, he could operate his business 
there. He mentions that GMC is located right next door. 
That is a misstatement. GMC is not located right next door 
to this property. It's approximately two blocks away on 
Seventh West, behind the jail facility and does not even 
abut or front this property. This property of Mr. Webber's 
is surrounded on three sides by agriculturally zoned 
property. 
The Court is familiar with the standard of 
review. The Court must not substitute its judgment for 
that of the zoning body, both the Planning & Zoning 
Commission and a reference—and also the city council. 
Even though the decision could be highly debatable, that 
does not render it arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
As the council has set forth, its basis of denial 
also—all was—all were supported by testimony, 
recommendations and findings. 
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We've discussed the issue of spot zoning. The 
only property that was sought to be rezoned in this 
application, I reiterate one more time, was the small 
parcel owned by Mr. Ty Webber. It is a home. He wants to 
change that home into a commercial facility surrounded by 
agricultural land. Agricultural land that the city 
council, in their legislative position and legislative 
capacity has—had determined by the general plan and by the 
zoning action on a repeated basis, that it needs to remain 
agricultural in nature. 
Now, much has been made about UTA, Salt Lake 
County Emergency Operation Center, Valley Mental Health. 
Those are quasi-public uses. Quasi-public uses were 
allowed in the ordinance as set forth by Salt Lake County. 
They are not allowed under amendments to the Salt—to the 
City of South Salt Lake zoning ordinance of approximately 
six months ago. The city council is desirous of retaining 
that as agricultural in nature. 
Your Honor, we believe our motion for summary 
judgment is—is well taken. The Court cannot substitute 
its judgment for the legislative body. Even though it may 
be highly debatable, it is not arbitrary, it was not 
capricious and there have been no allegations that it is 
illegal. 
And I'll submit it. 
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THE COURT: Mr- Parsons? 
MR. PARSONS: Just a moment, your Honor. Thank 
you. Appreciate the brevity that Mr. Hall engaged in and 
I'll to do likewise here. 
Mr. Hall pointed out that the—with regards to 
the business license issue, that a procedure for appeal 
thereof may have been appropriate at a later point—or at a 
prior point in time. I point you out Exhibits C and D to 
our memoranda and the body of our memoranda refers directly 
to those issues. 
The question of the business license and its 
denial was addressed by the City of South Salt Lake in the 
letters to Mr. Webber that are Exhibits C and D. Neither 
of those letters contained any findings, neither of those 
letters recite any evidence as to why not, they don't give 
any reasons as to why not, for the issuance of—the failure 
to—to reissue the business license, other than the fact 
that they claim that he had an illegal license in the first 
place, without saying what illegal meant or how he acquired 
an illegal. 
And neither of those letters, as is required by 
the statute, provided any instructions as to how to appeal 
the decision to not give the business license. We are 
properly before the Court with regards to the issue of the 
business license, having petitioned the Court for a review 
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of that subject matter. 
The—the concept of—of the spot zoning was an 
issue that Mr. Hall raised. In hearing after hearing, 
Beehive representatives, Hy & Mike's representatives, 
Sportsmen's representatives, in addition to Mr. Frederick 
and Mr. Webber, have all appeared and testified relative to 
the desire to make modifications to the zone, the rezone, 
so that they can conduct their businesses in the properties 
that they own. 
So, we are not talking about a spot involving Mr. 
Webber, it's just that he's the one that's brought the 
action. And Mr. Webber might well benefit without Hy & 
Mike or Beehive or Sportsmen's having to pay the attorney's 
fees to bring the action, if the Court were to conclude 
that in fact the nature of the property is commercial or 
quasi-commercial as opposed to agricultural in character. 
And finally, Mr. Hall did not address the 
question of whether or not we were or were not qualified 
under A-l zoning to do home occupation—a home occupation 
business. They haven't addressed that at all, they didn't 
address it in their response to our memoranda, they haven't 
addressed it in their oral arguments today. 
And as I indicated previously, there's no 
question but what the English common law, which has been 
followed closely by the Utah Supreme Court and reiterated 
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in the cases that I have cited to you, indicates clearly 
that if you don't prohibit us and give us an appropriate 
reason why the police powers ought to be exercised, to not 
allow you to engage in a certain kind of activity, then 
you're entitled to use our property as you wish to do so. 
That's it. Thanks, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Do you wish to respond to the last point? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, the reason we didn't 
address the business license is because we believe it's 
irrelevant and if it is relevant, they did not exhaust 
their administrative remedies. 
Mr. Webber's been represented from the beginning 
by counsel. On July 2nd, 1999, he was issued—given a 
letter saying that your license will not be—your 
application for a license will not be granted and in 
accommodation to you, until we—you re—run your zoning 
application through the zoning process, we'll let you stay 
there; but if it's denied, you must stop your business. 
We believe the issue as to the business license, 
number one, it's irrelevant to the petition for a review 
under 10-1-1001. That's why—that's the statute under 
which Mr. Parsons filed his action. Now, to bring in this 
other issue is irrelevant and even if it is relevant here 
today, they did not follow the administrative process and 
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the Court is without jurisdiction to hear that. 
And I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
It's the Court's decision to grant the motion for 
summary judgment of the defendant's. And my reasoning is, 
as argued by Mr. Hall, it is not the Court's prerogative to 
substitute its judgments for the city's and I find the 
city's actions not to be arbitrary or capricious from the 
arguments that have been articulated in oral argument and 
also set forth in the briefs. 
And to the extent that it's relevant, it seems to 
the Court also that there has been a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
Mr. Hall, would you prepare an order to the 
effect— 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I will. 
THE COURT: —consistent with my ruling. 
All right. Thank you, Counsel. 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within 
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same 
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 
to 38, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a 
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is 
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were 
inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 1st day of 
February, 2001. 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day 
of February, 2001. 
NOTARY ^'JQLIC 
365 3FAH?v*A OPiVE 
f s v ^ J V L * ! MURRAY, 1ST 84107 I X
*A^X;*J COMMISSION EXPIRES j 
DEC. 4, 2031 
STATE Or UTAH 
& 
»•*»»«'* »»ftft»mWB—n L>f/ «~ v..r r. 
Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 38, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible, 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of 
February, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM 8 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
H. CRAIG HALL (1307) 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
220 East Morris Avenue #200 
South Alt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone (801) 478-3607 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145-5678 
Phone (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE BAIL 
BONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000901508 
Judge William B. Bohling 
This matter came before the Court on September 18, 2000 for oral argument on 
the following motions: 
1. Defendant City of South Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Oral Argument; 
4. Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
5. Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits. 
Prior to oral argument, the Court had reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and 
exhibits submitted by the parties. Having considered these pleadings and the arguments of 
counsel and having issued its ruling from the bench at the conclusion of oral argument on 
September 18, 2000, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs3 Motion for Continuance, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits are denied. For 
purposes of ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court considered all of the 
pleadings submitted by the parties. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant City of South Salt Lake is 
hereby granted. Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Review of Decision and Amended 
Petition for Review of Decision seeking to have this Court judicially review the legislative 
zoning decision of the City of South Salt Lake. Plaintiffs' Petition is filed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101 et seq. and seeks review of a zoning decision pursuant to § 
10-9-1001. In conducting the narrow statutory review contemplated, this Court must 
limit its review to the record where the record is available and adequate. The Court finds 
that the legislative record is available and is adequate. Based upon the legislative record, 
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the Court concludes that Defendant's legislative determination denying Plaintiffs' request 
to re-zone his property from A-1 (Agriculture) to Business-A was not arbitrary capricious, 
or illegal. For this reason and the other reasons set forth in Defendant's supporting 
memoranda and exhibits, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken and 
granted. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. In addition to 
seeking reversal of Defendant's zoning decision based on the legislative record, Plaintiffs 
also argue that they are entitled to a zoning change and/or zoning variance because of a 
business license issued by Salt Lake County to Plaintiffs to operate their bail bonds 
business as a home prior to the property being annexed into the City of South Salt Lake 
on October 1, 1998. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies by failing to seek administrative review by the business license 
hearing board of City of South Salt Lake of the denial of Plaintiffs' request to issue them a 
business license. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue. 
For these and the other reasons set forth in Defendant's memoranda and exhibits, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
Based on the foregoing legal findings and conclusions, and for the reasons more 
fully set forth in Defendant's legal memoranda, Plaintiffs' Petition for Review and the 
claims and causes of action stated therein are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon 
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the merits, no cause of action. Each of the parties shall bear his or its respective costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. 
DATED this day of September, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PENNY L. EDWARDS, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law 
offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant, City of South Salt Lake, herein; that 
she served the attached Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiffs3 Motion for Summary Judgment in Civil No. 000901508 before the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah upon the parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
William B. Parsons IH 
440 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, hand delivered, on the If day of 
September, 2000. 
J± 'uvtux^ iztafuds^ 
Penny L. idwards 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this |M ' day of September, 2000. jcf 
QILV ... or., j ^ r o ^ , ro H 1 
Notary Public 
ADDENDUM 9 
Business License Granted to Statewide Bail Bonds by 
Lake County, July 23,1998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEWIDE BAIL BONDS 
Expires last day of: 
DEC 1998 
3350 S 900 W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84119-
IssueDate: 11/04/98 
Owner/Agent: TY 
WEBBER 
Basic Fees 
BASIC FEE 1 $ 4 0-0 0 
Regulatory Fees 
PHONE AND MAIL l Sl5m 
Business Type: 
Account Number: 37430 Chair» S a , t L a k e Coun ty Commission 
This license is granted to the Named Company to do the specified business in Salt Lake County at the above address. This Company 
has compiied with the provisions of the Ordinances of Salt Lake County governing this type of business and has paid the County 
Treasurer the necessary amount to operate such business for the period stated. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in business within Salt Lake County without first procuring a business license. 
(Salt Lake County Ordinance Sec. 5.16.020) 
This license is not transferable between owners and/or locations. This license is valid only for type of business stated. 
— Post this License in a Conspicuous Place at Business Location — 
Business License 
ADDENDUM 10 
Letter from South Salt Lake City to Tyron (sic) Webber and 
Statewide Bail Bonds, July 2,1999 
PHONE 801 / 483-6000 
FAX 801 / 483-6001 
W 220 EAST MORRIS AVENUE • SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 84115-3284 
July 2, 1999 
Tyron Webber 
Statewide Bail Bonds 
3350 South 900 West 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84119 
RE: Business Licensing 
Dear Mr. Webber; 
You submitted an application for a business license at the above location. We have been 
investigating the circumstances regarding the operations and have finally arrived at the following 
conclusions: 
1. At the Time of annexation, you were operating under a business license issued by Salt 
Lake County. 
2. The City of South Salt Lake honored that license by allowing operations of a bail 
bond office to continue as a nonconforming business with the provision that you meet all 
building code requirements for a business (requires an inspection and making any needed 
corrections for an approval) and not maintain any outside storage. 
3. Since then we have discovered that the business license issued to you by the County 
was in violation of the zoning regulations of the County and should NOT have been issued. 
Therefore, your business was NOT a legally operating business at the time of annexation and. as 
such, does not have any legal nonconforming status. 
4. The property is presently found within an A-l zone which does NOT allow 
businesses of your type (the same as the County). 
5. The City will not issue a new license for the property but, in the interest of equitable 
treatment and due to annexation issues, will allow a reasonable time for the operations to be 
relocated before taking any steps to force complete cessation of operations as noted in number 2 
herein. We will allow operation for the remainder of the year (to December 31, 1999) provided 
the items in number 6 herein are met. 
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6. In order to continue ANY operations, you need to comply with the terms of the 
original determination (see number 2 herein) by obtaining an inspection, making all necessary 
corrections, and ceasing all outside storage within 30 days of this letter OR you may cease all 
operations and relocate within the same time frame. You decide the best course for you. 
Should you desire to continue with a request for a change in zoning, you need to finish 
the Community Council process and submit a petition to the Planning Office, and, at the same 
time, request a review of the General Plan. Be advised that the chances of such happening 
quickly are slim, and the likelihood of any approval, at this time in the City's evolution and 
given the history of the area and the General Plan process, are negligible (the Planning 
Commission has held a Public Hearing on a request to change some zoning in the area and 
determined that they would not support any such change without a change in the General Plan of 
the City occurring first - no such change has occurred or is even in the works). 
Should you have further questions, feel free to contact the Community Development 
Department at 483-6011. For inspection scheduling, please call Business Licensing at 483-6063 
Sincerely, 
^JA 
Bruce Talbot, Director 
Community and Economic Development 
Cherie Wood 
Business License Official 
cc: Craig Hall, City Attorney 
Corey Carlson, Enforcement Officer 
Greg Sauter, Inspector 
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